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INTUITIVE PATENTING
Emily Michiko Morris*
Patentable subject matter determinations are ultimately based not on
judicial doctrines, tests, statutes, or even on the economic rationales underlying
the patent system; rather, the fundamental touchstone for what qualifies as
patentable technology is simply intuition. Specifically, despite the Federal
Circuit's rejection of "technological arts" as a linguistically bright-line test,
patentable subject matter decisions inevitably devolve into what is, at base, an
intuitive sense of what constitutes technology of the type protectable under the
patent system.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Patentable subject matter is a difficult issue just ask the Supreme Court. In
the last four years, the Court has agreed to hear four separate cases addressing
what exactly qualifies as patentable technology. The Court's decisions thus far
in Bilski v. Kappos,' Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories,2
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1. 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010).
2. 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012).
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Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc.,3 and Alice Corp. Pty.,
Ltd. v. CLS Bank International have provided disappointingly little instruction.
For an area of law designed to promote technological progress, one would think
that the patent system would be able to devise an equally scientific method for
dealing with its subject matter. Nonetheless, such precision seems impossible,
leaving the boundaries of patentable subject matter insolubly murky.'
This Article explains that this murkiness stems from the unavoidably
intuitionist nature of patentable subject matter distinctions. Several critics have
noted that the more notorious patentable subject matter decisions seem to be
6based on nothing more than intuition. However, patentable subject matter's
reliance on intuitionism is much more widespread than the critics realize-all
patentable subject matter determinations are based on intuition there are no
other, more objective bases on which to make these determinations.
The failure to identify objective criteria for patentable subject matter is not
for lack of effort. The case law on patentable subject matter discusses at length a
slew of doctrines, policy-based rationales, precedents, and statutory language,
but none of these can explain how patentable subject matter determinations are
actually made or, more importantly, why. The only thing known for certain
about patentable subject matter is the Constitution's objective that the patent
system "promote the Progress . . . in useful Arts,' 7 or what modem courts refer
to as "technology."' And although the Federal Circuit has rejected technological
arts as a linguistically bright-line test,9 the court implicitly recognize that, given
the Constitution's mandate, all patentable subject matter must be technological
by some measure. With the utter lack of useable objective criteria for defining
patentable subject matter, otherwise, however, the courts are left with nothing
other than a their own best guesses-that is, intuition to determine what is or is
not technology of the type protectable under the patent system.
3. 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013).
4. 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014).
5. John F. Duffy, Rules and Standards on the Forefront of Patentability, 51 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 609, 616 (2009).
6. See Kevin Emerson Collins, Bilski and the Ambiguity of "An Unpatentable Abstract
Idea ", 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 37, 39 (2011) [hereinafter Collins, Bilski] (citing Jacobellis v.
Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring)); Kevin Emerson Collins, Getting Into The
"Spirit" of Innovative Things: Looking to Complementary and Substitute Properties to Shape
Patent Protection for Improvements, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1217, 1236 (2011) [hereinafter
Collins, Spirit]; Duffy, supra note 5, at 619-20; Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Wisdom of the Ages or
Dead-Hand Control? Patentable Subject Matter for Diagnostic Methods After In re Bilski, 3 CASE
W. RESERVE J.L. TECH. & INTERNET 1, 44-45 (2012) (noting that "judicial exclusions of patentable
subject matter depend on the intuition of jurists").
7. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
8. See generally Robert I. Coulter, The Field of the Statutory Useful Arts, 34 J. PAT. OFF.
Soc'Y 417, 498 (1952) ("Probably the best word in common usage today that expresses this idea is
'technology.' The technological arts are the 'useful arts"') (emphasis in original).
9. See infra text accompanying notes 18-23.
62 [VOL. 66: 61
INTUITIVE PATENTING
This reliance on intuition was inevitable. Patent law is a one-size-fits-all
system that is designed not only to incentivize the creation of new and unique
inventions, but also to do so across a wide array of technologies. Creating
uniform patentable subject matter criteria to address such a wide diversity of
technology is difficult enough. Creating criteria that would optimize the balance
between incentivizing investments in technology without unduly hindering
future development is perhaps impossible, even improving the doctrine seems to
be an insurmountable task. Far from being the cause of this confusion, the patent
system's reliance on intuition is the inescapable result of this constant novelty
and unpredictability of technological development. While this kind of resort to
intuitionism may seem suspect, when there is no "right" answer to an
unfalsifiable question, intuition is no worse than any other answer.'o Patentable
subject matter is in good company this way, moreover. Intuition is thought to
drive subject matter decisions in copyright and trademark law as well."
The explanation of patentable subject matter's intuitionist nature proceeds as
follows. Part I introduces the problems of how patentable subject matter has
been defined thus far, and Part II then discusses in detail how the various
rationales and tests for patentable subject matter fail to explain how patentable
subject matter decisions are actually made. Identifying patentable technology is
instead a judgment call based on intuition. Part III then discusses the
implications of this reliance on intuitionism, explaining not only its inevitability
but also how it comports with other aspects of patent law and intellectual
property law more broadly.
II. THE PROBLEM OF PATENTABLE SUBJECT MATTER AND § 101
Generally stated, patentable subject matter restrictions are a threshold
limitation over what kind of works a patentee can have exclusive rights.12
Patents rights are in many ways property-like entitlements that putatively serve
at least two of the same major functions as property rights. First, patents are
designed to incentivize investments in research and development (R&D) by
granting patentees the property-like right to exclude all others from makin ,
using, selling, or offering to sell their inventions for a limited period of time.
Second, patents are designed to give potential infringers notice of the patentees'
exclusive rights and to delineate the boundaries of those rights.14
10. R. George Wright, The Role of Intuition in Judicial Decisionmaking, 42 HOUS. L. REV.
1381, 1394-95 (2013).
11. Dennis S. Karjala, Distinguishing Patent and Copyright Subject Matter, 35 CONN. L.
REv. 439, 476 (2003).
12. See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010) (quoting Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 101
(2012)); David S. Olson, Taking the Utilitarian Basis for Patent Law Seriously: The Case for
Restricting Patentable Subject Matter, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 181, 184 (2009).
13. Olson, supra note 12, at 192.
14. See Kenneth W. Dam, The Economic Underpinnings of Patent Law, 23 J. LEGAL STUD.
247, 254 (1994) (citing 35 U.S.C. §§ 102-103).
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Patents also create problems, however. Patents create potentially
monopolistic rights that can enable patent holders to raise prices to
supracompetitive levels while creating deadweight losses." Further, although a
patent immediately releases information about an invention to the public, a
patent also delays the invention's entry into the public domain, thereby hindering
its availability as a foundation for further invention.16 Moreover, as explained
below, patents are not the only form of intellectual property or property-like
rights that can protect creative endeavors, and perhaps some creative endeavors
just should not be deemed to be property at all. Thus, even though patent rights
expire after twenty years from the date of application, the patent system must
still carefully cabin what inventions may be the subject of a patent's
technological, and potentially economic, monopoly.' 7
The gateway restriction on what can be the subject of patent exclusivity is
patentable subject matter. All definitions of patentable subject matter must start
with Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution, which grants Congress the authority
"[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings
and Discoveries[.]"" Although modem usage would suggest that the patent
system covers "Science" and that copyright covers "useful Arts," the useful Arts
actually refers to what has become the subject of the patent system.1 9 The term
useful Arts is synonymous with what modem English refers to as technology and
the technical arts.2
What qualifies as "useful Art," as opposed to "Science" or some tertium
quid, however, is unclear. What is technology? As the Federal Circuit2 1 noted
in its recent In re Bilski decision, the words technical and technology are
15. Olson, supra note 12, at 193 (citing Julie E. Cohen & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Scope and
Innovation in the Software Industry, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1, 50 (2001)).
16. See Olson, supra note 12, at 196-97.
17. Olson, supra note 12, at 192-93 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2); Cohen & Lemley, supra
note 15, at 50).
18. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
19. See Coulter, supra note 8; Karl B. Lutz, Patents and Science: A Clarfication of the
Patent Clause of the U.S. Constitution, 18 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 50 (1949-50); Edward C.
Walterscheid, To Promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts: The Background and Origin of
the Intellectual Property Clause of the United States Constitution, 2 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 52 (1994)
(citing Arthur H. Seidel, The Constitution and a Standard of Patentability, 48 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 5,
10(1966)).
20. See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3224 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring); In re
Comiskey, 554 F.3d 967, 977 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (quoting Paulik v. Rizkalla, 760 F.2d 1270, 1276
(Fed. Cir. 1985) (en banc)); In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 959 (C.C.P.A. 1979) (quoting In re
Musgrave, 431 F.2d 882, 893 (C.C.P.A. 1970); see also Alan L. Durham, "Useful Arts" in the
Information Age, 1999 BYU L. REV. 1419, 1437-44; Lutz, supra note 19, at 54.
21. Founded in 1982 as the successor to the Court of Claims and Patent Appeals, the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit is the appellate court assigned exclusive jurisdiction over cases
"relating to patents." 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2012).
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ambiguous terms that depend on context,22 as technology is constantly
changing.23 The Federal Circuit has therefore rejected technological arts as a
bright-line, linguistic test for patentable subject matter.24 Both the Patent Act
and judicial precedent have attempted to clarify patentable subject matter by
setting forth statutory categories of included subject matter and common law
categories of excluded subject matter. Unfortunately, these categories have also
25proven to be rather vague.
Section 101 of the Patent Act, for example, states that patents may cover
"any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of
matter." 26 At first glance the statute seems plain enough, but proves difficult to
apply in practice. Part of the problem, of course, is technological change. The
language of Section 101 dates back to the Patent Act of 1793, but because
technology has obviously changed a great deal since then the courts have
interpreted Section 101's terms liberally to provide the necessary flexibility to
new technologies.27
The very liberality that allows such flexibility also creates problems,
however. Just as reading Section 101 too rigidly would render the statute
obsolete, reading Section 101 too broadly would render it meaningless. How to
draw the line between adapting Section 101 to future technologies while at the
same time remaining true to its limitations poses obvious challenges. The few
definitions the Patent Act provides are so self-referential as to be almost
meaningless. 28 Even Federal Circuit judges cannot agree amongst themselves as
to how best to define each category. Instead, the courts typically avoid
defining the categories, or even into which category a claimed invention might
fall, focusing rather on whether the invention falls into one of the categories of
unpatentable subject matter.30
22. 545 F.3d 943, 960 (2008) (en banc). For convenience, however, the following discussion
refers to "patentable technology" as synonymous with "useful Arts."
23. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 960; Interim Guidelines for Examination of Patent Applications
for Patent Subject Matter Eligibility, OFFICIAL GAZETTE FOR PAT. 1, 44 (Oct. 26, 2005),
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/dapp/opla/preognotice/guidelines 10120051026.pdf.
24. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 960; see also Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 200-01 (1981)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing In re Musgrave, 431 F.2d at 893; In re Benson, 441 F.2d 682, 688
(C.C.P.A. 1971); In re Foster, 438 F.2d 1011, 10 14-15 (C.C.P.A. 1971)).
25. Diamond, 450 U.S. at 219 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
26. Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
27. Duffy, supra note 5, at 620 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012); 35 U.S.C. § 100(b) (2012);
Act of Apr. 10, 1790, 1 Stat. 109, 110; 1793, 1 Stat. 318, 319).
28. See 35 U.S.C. § 100(b) (2012) (defining "process" as a "process, art, or method"); see
also Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 588 n.9 (1978) (noting ambiguity of Section 101's categories).
29. Compare, e.g., In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346, 1356-57 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (holding that
"manufactures" cannot be transitory), with id. at 1358 (Lynn, J., dissenting) (arguing that
"manufactures" are not so limited).
30. See In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d at 1362 (Linn, J., dissenting); Michael Risch, Everything is
Patentable, 75 TENN. L. REv. 591, 637-38 (2007) (citing Am. Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Brogdex Co.,
283 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1931).
2014] 65
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
In fact, perhaps because of the difficulties of defining Section 101's included
categories, patentable subject matter seems to be defined primarily by what it
does not include. The courts have developed three judicially defined exceptions
to patentable subject matter, generally referred to as "laws of nature,"
"phenomena of nature," and "abstract ideas." 3 1 The common law categories of
unpatentable subject matter are no less ambiguous than the statutory categories
of patentable subject matter,32 however, and suffer from much the same potential
for overbreadth. Just as the statutory categories of included subject matter could
be construed to cover that which is clearly unpatentable, the common law
categories of excluded subject matter could be construed to cover that which is
clearly patentable.33
The patent system has had a particularly difficult time differentiating
patentable processes under Section 101 from unpatentable laws of nature and
abstract ideas.34 Of all the categories of patentable subject matter, processes are
perhaps the most difficult to parse. 35 Although processes often involve the use
of manufactures, machines, and compositions of matter, processes differ from
those other three categories of patentable subject matter because processes are
31. Some courts use the terms products of nature or physical phenomena to refer to
phenomena of nature, as used in this Article. Courts also often refer to "mental processes" or
"mental steps" and "mathematical algorithms" as sub-types of excluded subject matter. The
discussion here, however, follows the Supreme Court's description of phenomena in nature, laws of
nature, and abstract ideas as the three main categories of exclusion. See Alice Corp. Pty v. CLS
Bank Int'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014) (quoting Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad
Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2116 (2013)); Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010)
(quoting Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980)). These common-law exceptions
reputedly date back at least 150 years. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3225.
32. See In re Warmerdam, 33 F.3d 1354, 1358-59 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (noting the patent system
"ha[s] sought to find more precise definitions for the things excluded, but without complete
success").
33. See, e.g., Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 219 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting
that almost any process could be described as an unpatentable algorithm or law of nature); Bancorp
Servs. v. Sun Life Assurance, 687 F.3d 1266, 1277 (2012) (noting that even machines are
sometimes equivalent to abstract ideas); In re Freeman, 573 F.2d 1237, 1245 (1978) (noting that all
processes can be characterized as "algorithms"); Donald S. Chisum, The Patentability of
Algorithms, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 959, 974, 977 (1986) (similar).
34. See, e.g., Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707, 728 (1880) (noting the line between a
patentable "process" and an unpatentable "principle" is not always clear); see also Duffy, supra
note 5, at 620 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012); 35 U.S.C. § 100(b); Act of Apr. 10, 1 Stat. 109,
110; Act of Feb. 21, 1793, 1 Stat. 318, 319); Robert A. Kreiss, Patent Protection for Computer
Programs and Mathematical Algorithms: The Constitutional Limitations for Patentable Subject
Matter, 29 N.M. L. REV. 31, 33 (1999).
35. See, e.g., Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 591-92 (1978) (citing Mackay Radio & Tel. Co.
v. Radio Corp. of Am., 306 U.S. 86 (1939); Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948);
O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62, 112-21 (1853)) (quoting Neilson v. Harford, Web. Pat. Cases 295,
371 (1844)) (explaining that it is often "very difficult" to distinguish patentable processes from "a
patent for a principle").
66 [VOL. 66: 61
INTUITIVE PATENTING
36
states of activity, not corporeal or structural entities. As the courts define them,
processes are "sequence[s] of actions" or "operation[s] or series of steps leading
to a useful result."3 7 The Supreme Court has noted that the term process as used
in Section 101 does not cover all processes that would fall within its plain
meaning, however.38 Merely to state that a process is a series of steps or actions
does not tell us anything about what kind of steps or actions qualify as a process.
As the Supreme Court stated in Parker v. Flook, "[t]he line between a patentable
'process' and an unpatentable 'principle' is not always clear. Both are
'[conceptions] of the mind, seen only by [their] effects when being executed or
performed."' 39
Similarly, the term abstract idea could be defined broadly enough to cover
all patentable inventions.40 As the courts have long reminded us, patents protect
the abstract inventive concept behind an invention, as opposed to the concrete
embodiments thereof.41 What then differentiates an abstract but patentable
inventive concept from an abstract but unpatentable idea? Further, what
differentiates an unpatentable algorithm from a patentable process? The patent
system has long excluded algorithms as unpatentable laws of nature or abstract
42ideas. The definition of algorithm does not refer only to mathematical
algorithms, however, but also to any set of rules or steps for solving a problem.4 3
Algorithms thus could be construed to cover both unpatentable and patentable
36. Flook, 437 U.S. at 588 n.9, 589 (citing Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 64 (1972));
see also 1 DONALD CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 1.03, at 1-109 (Matthew Bender ed., 2014)
(quoting various cases identifying processes as states of action).
37. 1 CHISUM, supra note 36, § 1.03, at 1-109 n.2.
38. See, e.g., Flook, 437 U.S. at 588-89 (citing 409 U.S. 63, 64 (1972)) (discussing
Gottschalk v. Benson's holding that "process" cannot be defined based on a purely literal reading of
section 101).
39. 437 U.S. at 589 (quoting Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707, 728 (1880)).
40. Donald S. Chisum, Weeds and Seeds in the Supreme Court's Business Method Patents
Decision: New Directions for Regulating Patent Scope, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 11, 14 (2011);
see also Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 46 (observing that the abstract idea category is too vague and
uncertain to serve as much of a gatekeeper).
41. See, e.g., Duffy, supra note 5, at 642 (quoting 1 WILLIAM C. ROBINSON, THE LAW OF
PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS § 134, at 190-92 (1890)) ("No proposition has been more
frequently or positively stated by the courts than that a principle is not a patentable invention, and
yet with almost equal positiveness and frequency they have declared that the subject-matter covered
by a patent is the principle of the invention."); Alan L. Durham, The Paradox of "Abstract Ideas, "
2011 UTAH L. REV. 797, 843-44 (2011); Emily Michiko Morris, Res or Rules Patents and the
(Uncertain) Rules ofthe Game, 18 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 481, 498 (2012).
42. E.g., Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1299-1300 (2012)
(quoting Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 586, 598 (1978)) (citing Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175,
192 (1981)) (referring to an algorithm as a "law of nature"); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71-
72 (1972) (comparing mathematical algorithm at issue there with laws of nature); In re
Warmerdam, 33 F.3d 1354, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (stating that mathematical constructs are "the
paradigmatic 'abstract idea').
43. In re Freeman, 573 F.2d 1237, 1245-46 (C.C.P.A. 1978) (quoting In re Chatfield, 545
F.2d 152, 158 (C.C.P.A. 1976).
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subject matter, including processes and even machines. In fact, many
inventions claimed as machines or manufactures have been rejected as
unpatentable abstract ideas.45 Given the wide and amorphous boundaries of the
categories of exclusion, what distinguishes a patentable inventive concept from
an unpatentable abstract idea or law of nature is unclear.
The problem with the categories of patentable and unpatentable subject
matter is not just one of definition and technological change, moreover.
Technologies rarely exist as discrete categories. Nothing exists as a pure
process, machine manufacture, or composition of matter untainted by
46
unpatentable elements. All inventions use products of nature as their starting
materials at the very least, and all inventions rely on laws of nature, abstract
ideas, or both.47 The question thus becomes one of degree: how much changed
from nature and how much in addition to an abstract idea does a claimed
invention need to qualify as patentable subject matter under Section 101? More
importantly, how is this measured? Unfortunately, the few definitions available
for Section 101's categories of included subject matter and the common law
categories of excluded subject matter provide no clues.48
The courts have consequently tried to define patentable technology and
identify patentable subject matter through other means.49 The various statutory
and common law categories, judicial doctrines and tests, and policy-derived
rationales cited for patentable subject matter determinations are merely post hoc
rationalizations in support of determinations apparently made by other means.
The discussion below shows that what ultimately drives patentable subject
matter law is nothing more than intuition-specifically, an intuitive sense of
what patentable technology is and therefore what fits within the Constitution's
mandate for the patent system.
In some patentable subject matter cases this reliance on intuition is blatantly
clear. The Supreme Court's recent decision in Bilski v. Kappos is a prime
44. See, e.g., Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 219 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(discussing patentability of programs and un-patentability of process); Bancorp Servs. v. Sun Life
Ins. 687 F.3d 1266, 1277 (2012) ("[A] machine, system, medium, or the like may in some cases be
equivalent to an [algorithm] for purposes of patent ineligibility."); In re Freeman, 573 F.2d at 1245-
46 (C.C.P.A. 1978) (quoting In re Chatfield, 545 F.2d 152, 158 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (noting that every
process may be characterized as an algorithm); Chisum, supra note 40, at 974-75 (quoting M.
MACHTEY & P. YOUNG, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE GENERAL THEORY OF ALGORITHMS 1 (1978);
M. AISERMAN, L. GUSEV, L. ROZONOER, 1. SMIRNOVA & A. TAL', LOGIC, AUTOMATA, AND
ALGORITHMS 305 (1971)) (noting broad definition of algorithms and their overlap with
"processes").
45. See Emily Michiko Morris, What Is Technology?, 20 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 24, 51-55
(2014).
46. See id. at 45-46, 50.
47. Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2116 (2013)
(quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs., 132 S. Ct. at 1293); Merck & Co. v. Olin Mathieson Chem.
Corp., 253 F.2d 156, 161-62 (4th Cir. 1958)).
48. See In re Warmerdam, 33 F.3d 1354, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
49. See infra Part III.
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example. 50 In Bilski, the Court majority held that that Bilski's business method
was an abstract idea and therefore unpatentable." Despite the patent bar's hope
that the Supreme Court would finally clarify how to identify an abstract idea,
however, neither the majority opinion nor the concurring opinions offered any
52
explanation for what constitutes an abstract idea. Search Bilski high and low
for a neat delineation of what patentable subject matter is and all one will find is
the various Justices' conviction that, whatever the proper definition of patentable
subject matter may be, the business method at issue in Bilski "clearly" did not
qualify.53 Anyone reading the Court's decision might get the impression that
patentable subject matter is like obscenity we know it when we see it.54
In most cases, however, the courts' reliance on intuitive decision-making is
subtler. Again, in most cases the courts cite to statutory language, judicial
precedent, rules, doctrines, policies and rationales in justifying their decisions,
but more rigorous analysis shows that these justifications do not actually explain
the outcomes. The following section reviews the various rationales and
doctrines that have supposedly dictated patentable subject matter determinations
to demonstrate this fact in more detail.
III. PATENTABLE SUBJECT MATTER AS INTUITION
The statutory and common law categories of patentable and unpatentable
subject matter are best viewed as rough classifications, and as such require some
interpretation. Patent law is a one-size-fits-all system, after all, and any attempt
to divide all technologies ever invented and yet to be invented into neat, self-
defining categories would be impossible.
The patent system has therefore devised an array of linguistic frameworks
for delineating patentable subject matter, such as the new machine doctrine, the
mental steps doctrine, the useful, concrete, and tangible result test, the machine
or transformation test, and more. Rather than clarifying patentable subject
matter, however, the courts in effect have created just another level of
abstraction, this time by using judicial doctrines and tests to define the categories
50. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3231 (2010).
51. Id.
52. See generally Andrew Chin, The Elusive "Marketplace" in Post-Bilski Jurisprudence, 34
CAMP. L. REV. 663 (2012) (criticizing the Bilski decision for its lack of guidance); Collins, Bilski,
supra note 6, at 39; Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 18-19 (similar).
53. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3231; see also id. at 3236 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("The Court, in
sum, never provides a satisfying account of what constitutes an unpatentable abstract idea");
Collins, Bilski, supra note 6, at 39 (characterizing the Court's decision "as a bald and unreasoned
assertion"); Joseph Scott Miller, Symposium, Introduction, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1, 7 (2011)
(describing Court's Bilski decision as "more gesture than analysis").
54. See Collins, Bilski, supra note 6, at 39 (quoting Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197
(1964) (Stewart, J., concurring)); Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 45 (characterizing patentable subject
matter as "seat-of-the-pants intuitions of jurists from earlier eras").
55. See Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3224 (quoting In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 954, 955, 960 n.19
(Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc)).
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of included and excluded subject matter that in turn are supposed to define
patentable technology. The overall effect is to shift the focus of patentable
subject matter to yet other inquiries that have proven rather unstable over time.
The various judicial doctrines and tests have invariably been ill-equipped to deal
with the vicissitudes of technological progress. The courts have had to create so
many exceptions to, and otherwise stretch, these tests that most are ultimately
discarded as unworkable.5 6
The ultimate root of the problem is that what patentable subject matter
restrictions will best further the patent system's constitutional purpose of
promoting Progress in useful Arts is simply unknown and unknowable. How
can the patent system define the categories of included or excluded subject
matter, or doctrines to differentiate between the two, when the question of
whether the patent system has any effect at all, much less how to optimize those
effects is indeterminable.5  The indeterminacy of what kind of subject matter
should or should not be patentable has resulted in a series of what is nothing
more than ipse dixit. The courts have merely assumed that the categories of
unpatentable subject matter are deemed so because the categories in some way
would hinder, or at least would not promote, such progress.59 This assumption,
in turn, has given rise to a number of derivative rationales such as the idea that
patents on discoveries would preempt too much future innovation, that certain
classes of subject matter do not need patent incentives, that only man-made
inventions promote technological progress, and so on.60
Although these policy-based rationales sound like pragmatic and
economically driven explanations for patentable subject matter, they actually
explain very little and are instead often more confusing than helpful. When
compared to how the courts actually decide patentable subject matter cases, the
various derivative rationales have limited explanatory power. If actually applied,
the derivative rationales would be both underinclusive and overinclusive and
even contradictory at times, excluding much of what the courts and the United
States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) have held to be patentable
technology, while including much of what the courts and the PTO have rejected
as unpatentable. The various statutory and common law categories, judicial
doctrines and tests, and policy-derived rationales cited for patentable subject
matter determinations are merely post hoc rationalizations in support of
determinations apparently made by other means. Instead, what actually drives
56. See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 958-60.
57. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
58. See Tun-Jen Chiang, Defining Patent Scope by the Novelty of the Idea, 89 WASH. U.L.
REv. 1211, 1239 (2012); Duff, supra note 5, at 619-20; Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 45. But see
Olson, supra note 12 (arguing that we can set patentable subject matter restrictions to include only
innovations that would not have arisen without patent incentives).
59. See generally Allen K. Yu, Within Subject Matter Eligibility A Disease and a Cure, 84
S. CAL. L. REv. 387 (2011) (questioning whether current doctrine truly promotes progress).
60. See infra Part II.
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patentable subject matter is an intuitive sense of what constitutes patentable
technology.
A. The Preemption Rationale
The most frequently cited rationale for categorizing phenomena of nature,
laws of nature, and abstract ideas as unpatentable subject matter focuses on the
61potential harms, particularly to future innovation. Under this rationale,
phenomena of nature, laws of nature, and abstract ideas are themselves not
technology but rather serve as the essential building blocks, fundamental
principles, and "basic tools of scientific and technological work" from which
technology is made.62  Patenting such foundational elements such as natural
phenomena would monopolize and preempt the use of these basic building
blocks,63 hindering rather than promoting future invention by creating patent
anticommons, thickets, or other holdup problems.64 This rationale thus depicts
phenomena of nature, laws of nature, and abstract ideas as categorically and
fundamentally different in their breadth of scope and consequent effect on future
invention.65 The concern that patenting phenomena of nature, laws of nature,
and abstract ideas would categorically hinder future invention may be a very
valid one, but in terms of patentable subject matter, this concern is a bit of
misdirection because it does not reflect how courts actually distinguish
patentable inventions from unpatentable phenomena of nature.
At first glance, the argument against patenting "fundamental building
blocks" such as natural phenomena may seem quite sound, for "all inventions at
some level embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of nature, natural
phenomena, or abstract ideas."66 Taken in its most literal form, however, this
building block rationale argues too much. It is not just natural phenomena, laws
of nature, or abstract ideas that serve as the building blocks for future inventions;
61. Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S.Ct. 2107, 2116 (2013);
Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., 132 S.Ct. 1289, 1293 (2012); Alice Corp. Pty.,
Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014).
62. Id. (quoting Ass'n for Molecular Pathology 133 S. Ct. at 2116); see generally Katherine
J. Strandburg, Much Ado Preemption, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 563 (2012) (discussing the "preemption"
rationale of patentable subject matter).
63. See Alice Corp., 134 S. Ct. at 2354; Mayo Collaborative Servs., 132 S. Ct. at 1294; Bilski
v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3231 (2010); Parker v. Flook, 437 U. S. 584, 589-90 (1978) (quoting
Benson, 409 U.S. at 71-72).
64. See Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCI. 698, 699 (1998); Arti Kaur Rai, Regulating
Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of Science, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 77,
120-35 (1999); Joshua D. Sarnoff, Patent-Eligible Inventions After Bilski: History and Theory, 63
HASTINGS L.J. 53, 120 (2011).
65. See Sarnoff, supra note 64, at 120.
66. Alice Corp., 134 S. Ct. at 2354 (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs., 132 S. Ct. at 1293);
Ass'n for Molecular Pathology, 133 S. Ct. at 2116 (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs., 132 S. Ct.
at 1293).
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technology is inherently cumulative, and any invention patented today may serve
as a building block for further inventions created tomorrow. If the patent
system were to exclude as unpatentable anything that might serve as a
foundation for future invention, it would have to exclude most, if not all,
patentable inventions as well because all patents grant technological monopolies
over, and thereby preempt, the claimed subject matter regardless of what that
subject matter might be.68
The courts do not actually distinguish patentable from unpatentable subject
matter on the basis of their respective preemptive breadth; moreover, judgments
about future preemptive effects are often quite speculative.69 As the Supreme
Court recently explained in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus
Laboratories, "our cases have not distinguished among different laws of nature
according to whether or not the principles they embody are sufficiently narrow
[because c]ourts and judges are not institutionally well suited to making the
kinds of judgments [needed] to distinguish among different laws of nature. 70
The courts instead concede to using the categories of excluded subject matter as
proxies for their concerns about preemption.7 ' There is good reason to doubt
that the current categories of excluded subject matter serve as reliable proxies for
preemptive breadth, however.
First, the preemptive effect of a patent is much more complicated than just
the nature of its subject matter. The preemptive effect of any given patent
depends on how difficult it is for later inventors to invent around that patent; the
more future inventive efforts depend on access to a patent's claimed subject
72
matter, the broader that patent's ability will be to hold up future development.
Broad patents covering a wide range of embodiments can obviously pose the risk
of broad preemptive effects, but so might relatively narrow patents covering only
one or two embodiments, especially if those embodiments are essential to future
developments. Preemption depends not so much on claim breadth or the breadth
of covered embodiments as on preemptive breadth breadth of later inventive
efforts that might need to incorporate one or more of those embodiments.73
67. See generally Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative
Research and the Patent Law, 5 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 29 (1991) (discussing the cumulative
nature of technological development).
68. See CLS Bank Int'l v. Alice Corp. Pty., 717 F.3d 1269, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (Lourie, J.,
concurring); Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & James P. Evans, From Bilski Back to Benson: Preemption,
Inventing Around, and the Case of Genetic Diagnostics, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1349, 1371 (2011);
Strandburg, supra note 62, at 588-89.
69. Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90
COLUM. L. REV. 839, 848 (1990).
70. 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1303 (2012).
71. See id.
72. See generally Dreyfuss & Evans, supra note 68, at Pt.III (arguing that preemptive effects
depend on the "ability to invent around").
73. See Collins, Bilski, supra note 6, at 58-59 (discussing Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63,
67 (1972)); Dreyfuss & Evans supra note 68, at 1371; Strandburg, supra note 62, at 588-89.
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A patent's preemptive breadth thus hinges on not just how many
embodiments are covered or whether the claimed subject matter has any
meaningful substitutes, but also whether future technological development
would have any need for either the patented invention or its substitutes.74 This,
in turn, depends at least as much, if not more, on the nature of the technology at
issue, how likely inventors in that area of technology are to license to each other,
and how easy it is to design around the patented subject matter. Unless there is
reason to believe that phenomena of nature, laws of nature, and abstract ideas
categorically tend to be more preemptive along all these dimensions, it is
difficult to see why the patent system should exclude laws and phenomena of
nature as unpatentable on that basis.76
For example, patentable processes, machines, manufactures, and
compositions of matter can often have a significant preemptive effect, while
unpatentable subject matter often has relatively little impact one way or the other
on future inventions. Patents on pioneering new technologies, for example, can
be broad in scope because they open entirely new areas of technological research
and development. Integrated circuits revolutionized the electronics industry,
just as recombinant DNA and polymerase chain reaction (PCR) techniques
enabled genetic engineering and the scanning tunneling microscope, and the
atomic force microscopes made nanotechnology possible.7 ' To work in
electronics, genetic engineering, or nanotechnology, one must have access to
these foundational inventions, and as a consequence the patents on these
technologies had broad power to preempt future developments in their respective
fields by effectively controlling entry into the field.79
Many phenomena of nature, laws of nature, and abstract ideas, on the other
hand, can be quite limited in scope and potential preemptive effect.so Take the
74. See Collins, Bilski, supra note 6, at 58-59 (quoting Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63,
67 (1972) (discussing the idea that "almost all technological progress builds on a foundation
provided by earlier innovators)); Dreyfuss & Evans, supra note 68, at 1371; Strandburg, supra note
62, at 588-89.
75. Dreyfuss & Evans, supra note 68, at 1371-72; Merges & Nelson, supra note 69, at 848;
Strandburg, supra note 62, at 579.
76. Strandburg, supra note 62, at 590 (noting that this is an implausible assumption).
77. John R. Thomas, The Question Concerning Patent Law and Pioneer Inventions, 10 HIGH
TECH. L.J. 35, 36-37 (1995) (citing Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods, Co., 339 U.S. 605,
608 (1950)).
78. See Michael L. Darby & Lynne G. Zucker, Grilichesian Breakthroughs: Inventions of
Methods ofInventing and Firm Entry in Nanotechnology, in [No. 79/80] ANNALES D'ECONOMIE ET
DE STATISTIQUE 146, 146 & n.3 (Ass'n Dev. Res. Econ. & Stat., ed. 2005); Mark A. Lemley,
Patenting Nanotachnology, 58 STAN. L. REV. 601, 610-11 (2005).
79. See O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62, 133-34 (1853); see also Strandburg, supra note 62, at
580-82.
80. See, e.g., Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1303 (2012)
(referencing patents on nature); see also Strandburg, supra note 62, at 577-78 (quoting Gottschalk
v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)) (Not all 'phenomena of nature, though just discovered, mental
processes and abstract intellectual concepts' have sweeping downstream impact. . . .").
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invention at issue in Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 81 for
example. Funk Brothers involved a patent on an inoculant for leguminous crops
made by combining certain nitrogen-fixing root nodule bacteria strains.82 The
Supreme Court invalidated the patent as nothing more than "the handiwork of
nature."83 This patent nonetheless covered only selected species of Rhizobium
bacteria, only selected strains of those species in combination, and only as an
inoculant for legumes.84  All other Rhizobium bacteria, as well as even the
particular strains of bacteria that Bond used in his inoculant, remained free for
use in other combinations or other inventions.
Similarly, an abstract idea can be quite narrow in both claim breadth and
potential preemptive breadth, as Justice Stevens suggested in his concurrence in
86Bilski v. Kappos. And if a person were to attempt to patent a cat for use as a
pet or the sum of a social security number, an age, and the number of socks in
one's closet at any given time for use as a lottery number, both of those patents
would be rejected as a phenomenon of nature and an abstract idea, respectively,
even though they are narrow enough in both claim and preemptive scope that no
future inventor would ever care about such patents.8 7
Perhaps because phenomena of nature, laws of nature, and abstract ideas are
clearly not the only subject matter that can have broad preemptive effects, the
Supreme Court recently tried to shift the focus, explaining that while preemptive
scope per se may not be problematic, the concern is nonetheless a "relative one:
how much future innovation is foreclosed relative to the contribution of the
inventor." Regardless of whether it is broad or narrow in scope, the Court
suggested that unpatentable subject matter has so little creative value that it
invariably detracts from technological progress more than it contributes.89
For example, in the recent Supreme Court decision, Mayo Collaborative
Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, the patent at issue involved a method of
improving thiopurine treatment of autoimmune disorders by administering the
thiopurine, measuring the patient's thiopurine metabolite levels, and then
81. 333 U.S. 127, 131 (1948).
82. Id. at 130-3 1.
83. Id. at 130.
84. Id. at 129.
85. Id. at 130; see also Strandburg, supra note 62, at 583 (observing that the invention in
Funk Bros. was no more preemptive than the one in Chakrabarty). But see Sichelman, supra note
73, at 377 (describing Funk's inoculant as foreclosing too much future innovation).
86. See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3235 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring).
87. Cf Kevin Emerson Collins, Claims to Information Qua Information and a Structural
Theory of Section 101, 4 I/S: J.L. & POLY FOR INFO. SocY 11, 22 (2008) (noting that even definite,
"bounded" information would be unpatentable under Section 101).
88. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1303 (2012) (emphasis
in original); accord Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 152-53
(1950); see also generally Mark A. Lemley et al., Life After Bilski, 63 STAN. L. REv. 1315, 1330
(2011) ("The question is whether the inventor has contributed enough to merit a claim so broad that
others will be locked out").
89. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 132 S. Ct. at 1303.
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adjusting subsequent thiopurine doses according to that data. 90 The Supreme
Court acknowledged that the patent at issue was narrow in scope, but the Court
held that the patent nevertheless "would risk disproportionately tying up the use
of the underlying natural laws" relative to its contribution to the field.9 '
Although the diagnostic method in Prometheus appeared to be novel, non-
obvious, enabled, and useful, the Court invalidated it as overly broad and
unpatentable subject matter. 92
Although it is an arguably more nuanced rationale, there is much reason to
doubt that all phenomena of nature, laws of nature, and abstract ideas are even
disproportionately broad in preemptive scope. Again, phenomena of nature,
laws of nature, and abstract ideas can be quite narrow in scope, while many
discoveries about natural phenomena and laws can be pivotal contributions to
technological progress by facilitating later invention and even by opening up
new fields of technology.93 "[T]he inventions most benefiting mankind are those
that 'push back the frontiers of chemistry, physics, and the like."' 94
Identification of the double helical structure of DNA, the unusual characteristic
materials at the nanoscopic level, and other such natural phenomena have played
a seminal role in advancing technological progress.95 Even the Court in Funk
Brothers admitted that the invention at issue was "ingenious," and saved farmers
from having to buy and work with multiple inoculants.96 One cannot simply
dismiss laws and phenomena of nature on the assumption that they necessarily
hinder more future progress than they promote.97
Many processes, machines, manufactures, and compositions of matter, on
the other hand, contribute very little to technological progress and yet are
considered patentable subject matter. Indeed, some so-called pioneering patents
may play only a comparatively small role in later applications depending on how
much additional technological investment and development the later applications
require.9 The patent system nonetheless allows such pioneering inventions,
90. Id. at 1294-95.
91. Id. at 1294.
92. Id. at 1301.
93. See, e.g., Coulter, supra note 8, at 498 ("[A]dvances of pure science have paved the way
for further advances of the useful arts .... ).
94. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 316 (1980) (quoting Great At. & Pac. Tea Co. v.
Supermarket Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 154 (1950) (concurring opinion)); accord Lab. Corp. of Am.
Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 126-27 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
("[Discoveries about nature] may prove of great benefit to the human race.").
95. See, e.g., John J. Doll, The Patenting of DNA, 280 SCIENCE 689, 689-90 (1998)
(discussing DNA); Lemley, supra note 78, at 602 (discussing nanotechnology).
96. Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 131 (1948).
97. See, e.g., ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND
POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 77 (LexisNexis ed., 5th ed. 2011) (quoting Diamond v.
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 316 (1980)) (noting that some unpatentable subject matter has
benefitted mankind more than some marginal but patentable innovations); Scotchmer, supra note
67, at 31 (noting the multiple ways in which basic research facilitates later innovation).
98. See Merges & Nelson, supra note 69, at 865-66; Scotchmer, supra note 67, at 31.
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often granting them broad patent protection,9 9 even if they have the potential to
block downstream developments while providing relatively little contribution of
their own.'0 0
The way in which courts actually decide cases also belies any claim that
patentable subject matter is about preemptive scope. If preemptive scope were
truly a motivating concern, the patent system would place greater emphasis on
the characteristics of a claimed invention that more directly relate to its
preemptive potential. The courts seem instead to reject such preemption specific
approaches.
For example, for many years the courts applied the Freeman- Walter-Abele
test, named after the three cases in which the Federal Circuit developed the test
to determine whether processes or other claims would preempt mathematical
algorithms.101 The first step was to determine whether the claim even recited a
mathematical algorithm or mental step and, if so, the second step looked at
whether the algorithm was "applied in [some] manner to [specific] physical
elements or [physical] process steps" and that those elements or steps would
themselves would be "statutory subject matter."1 02
Freeman- Walter-Abele did not last long, however. Criticized for its
perceived focus on single claim elements rather than the invention as a whole,103
the Freeman- Walter-Abele test was soon replaced. In In re Alappat the Federal
Circuit stated that the correct test required only that the process at issue yield a
useful, concrete, and tangible result.104 Like the Freeman- Walter-Abele test, the
99. Because "pioneers" patents face little scope-limiting prior art, they often enjoy quite
broad claim and preemptive-scope. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent
Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1656-57 (2003) (discussing broad range of protection); see also Perkin-
Elmer Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 822 F.2d 1528, 1532 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (citing Sealed Air
Corp v. U. S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 645 F.2d 976, 984 (C.C.P.A. 1981)) ("A pioneer invention is
entitled to a broad range of equivalents.").
100. Merges & Nelson, supra note 69, at 865-68 (quoting Boyden Power-Brake Co. v.
Westinghouse 170 U.S. 537, 572 (1898); Texas Instruments v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 846 F.2d
1369, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 1988)) (discussing methods of judging infringement, such as the reverse
doctrine of equivalents, that can help remedy this effect); Scotchmer, supra note 67, at 37-38
(noting uncertainty of optimal patent breadth for inventions that enable future inventions).
101. In re Abele, 684 F.2d 902, 905-07 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (citations omitted); In re Walter, 618
F.2d 758, 767 (C.C.P.A. 1980); In re Freeman, 573 F.2d 1237, 1245 (C.C.P.A. 1978) (citing
Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71 (1972)).
102. In re Abele, 684 F.2d at 906-07 (quoting In re Walter, 618 F.2d at 767); accord
Arrhythmia Res. Tech. v. Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d 1053, 1058-59 (Fed. Cir. 1992); In re Grams,
888 F.2d 835, 838-39 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (quoting In re Meyer, 688 F.2d 789, 796 (C.C.P.A. 1982); In
re Abele, 684 F.2d at 907).
103. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 958-59 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc) (quoting In re Abele, 684
F.2d at 905-07); AT&T Corp. v. Excel Comm. Mktg., Inc., 172 F.3d 1352, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 1999);
Vincent Chiappetta, Patentability of Compute Software Instruction as an "Article of Manufacture:"
Software as Such as the Right Stuff 17 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO L. 89, 108 n.85 (1998).
104. 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994); see also AT&T Corp., 172 F.3d at 1357 (citing In re
Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1994)); Interim Guidelines, supra note 23, at 45-46 (quoting
State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Sig. Fin. Grp., Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 1998); In re
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useful, concrete, and tangible test was at least nominally designed to prevent
patentees from wholly preempting mathematical algorithms or laws of nature.'0o
Unlike the Freeman- Walter-Abele test, however, the useful, concrete, and
tangible test required only that a process employ particular steps to accomplish
specific and useful functions in order to avoid preemption.106 The useful,
concrete, and tangible test was thus more expansive than Freeman- Walter-Abele,
and rejected any requirement that an algorithm or mental step be limited by
physical elements. 0 7 The most famous applications of the useful, concrete, and
tangible test were in State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Finance Group,
Inc. and AT&T Corp. v. Excel Communications, in which the Federal Circuit
approved two business methods, one as claimed on a computer and one as
claimed as a pure method, respectively.! However, the useful, concrete, and
tangible test quickly came under fire for its liberality, particularly because it
seemed to open the door to freely patenting business methods and computer
software.109 The Federal Circuit soon discarded the test in In re Bilski, a move
that the Supreme Court endorsed." 0
The Federal Circuit instead moved on to the machine or transformation test.
Under this test, a process is patentable if it either: (1) is tied to a particular
machine or apparatus, or (2) transforms a particular article into a different state
or thing."' Under this test, the Federal Circuit in In re Bilski rejected a business
method for hedging investment risk because the method did not satisfy the
test.112 The Supreme Court subsequently cautioned that the machine or
transformation test is not the sole test for processes but acknowledged that the
test is a "useful and important clue, an investigative tool, for determining
whether some claimed inventions are processes under § 101.",113 The lower
Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1543 n.21; AT&T Corp., 172 F.3d at 1359) (citing Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S.
175 (1981); Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980)); Cohen & Lemley, supra note 15, at 10.
105. AT&T Corp., 172 F.3d at 1357 (citing In re Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1570); Interim
Guidelines, supra note 23, at 20 (quoting AT&T Corp., 172 F.3d at 1358) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 101
(2012)).
106. In re Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1570 (quoting Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972));
Interim Guidelines, supra note 23, at 20 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 101).
107. AT&T Corp., 172 F.3d at 1359-60 (citations omitted).
108. AT&T Corp., 172 F.3d at 1357-58; State StreetBank, 149 F.3d at 1373.
109. See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 1004 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc) (Mayer, J., dissenting);
Dan L. Burk, Patenting Speech, 79 TEx. L. REV. 99, 139-40 (2000); Chiappetta, supra note 103, at
111-12 (quoting and citing Alappat, 33 F. 3d at 1544-45).
110. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3231; id. at 3232 n.1 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring)
(quoting State Street, 149 F.3d at 1373); In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 960; see also Lab. Corp. v.
Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 136 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting State Street, 149
F.3d at 1373) (criticizing the useful, concrete, and tangible test).
111. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 961.
112. Id. at 964-65.
113. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3227.
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courts have therefore continued to use the machine or transformation test as "a
useful and important clue" under Section 101.114
Why did the Federal Circuit reject the useful, concrete, and tangible test in
favor of the machine or transformation test? All three tests for processes-the
Freeman- Walter-Abele test, the machine or transformation test, and the useful,
concrete, and tangible test were designed to prevent inventors from preempting
fundamental principles like mathematical algorithms. The useful, concrete, and
tangible test, however, clearly allowed patents of greater breadth than either the
Freeman- Walter-Abele or machine-or-transformation test." 5  If overbreadth
were truly a motivating concern, why not retain Freeman- Walter-Abele's scope
narrowing physicality requirements or the machine or transformation test's
similar requirements?
Despite their scope narrowing effects, the Bilski court nonetheless rejected
the requirements under the Freeman- Walter-Abele and machine or
transformation tests as too inflexible.11 6  The court's reservations about the
machine or transformation test connote the court's sense that, while useful,
bright-line rules such as the machine or transformation test do not capture what
distinguishes patentable from unpatentable subject matter. With regard to the
machine or transformation test, for instance, the Supreme Court explained that
the test "would create uncertainty" about Information Age technologies,
suggesting that some inventions may be patentable subject matter even if not tied
to machines, transformations, or physical elements." 7 Other inventions that do
involve machines or transformative effects, on the other hand, have often been
held not to be patentable subject matter.
The courts' rejection of the Freeman-Walter-Abele and machine or
transformation tests relates to yet another reason to doubt that patentable subject
restrictions have anything to do with preemptive scope. Again, if overbreadth
were truly a motivating concern, any scope narrowing limitations, whether
Freeman- Walter-Abele's required physical limitations, the machine or
transformation test's required machine or transformation limitations, or any other
limitations would presumably be important to patentable subject matter analyses.
Adding limitations to a patent claim narrows its scope by leaving both future
inventors and the public free to use the claimed subject matter outside of those
limitations.11 9 Put differently, the more limitations appended to any particular
114. Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assurance Co., 687 F.3d 1266, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2012)
(quoting In re Biliski, 130 S. Ct. at 3227); accord PerkinElmer, In. v. Intema Ltd., 496 Fed. Appx
65m 72-73 (Fed. Cir. 2012); CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1371
(Cir. 2011) (quoting Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3227).
115. See, e.g., JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL MEURER, PATENT FAILURE 211 (2008) (citations
omitted); Dreyfuss & Evans, supra note 68, at 1359 (discussing the "broad reach" of the test).
116. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3227.
117. Id.
118. See infra text accompanying notes 132-34, 248-57.
119. See, e.g., Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 589-90 (1978) (quoting Gottschalk v. Benson,
409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)) ("Respondent correctly points out that [he] does not seek to 'wholly
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claim, the less preemptive scope the claim has and the easier it is for future
inventors to design around that claim.1 20
The courts often reject the addition of such scope narrowing limitations as
insufficient to affect the patentable subject matter analysis, however.121 In many
cases courts have dismissed scope narrowing restrictions as "token,"
"insignificant," or "well-understood, routine, [and] conventional."1 22  For
example, courts have rejected attempts to limit claims to what they viewed as
algorithms or other abstract ideas, dismissing data gathering steps as
"meaningless limits" and "insignificant extra-solution activi;123 computer
readable medium limitations as not "sufficiently meaningful;" 2 and limitations
to a "general purpose" computer as "an obvious mechanism."1 25  Similarly, the
patent in Funk Brothers was limited in patent scope to only certain combinations
of Rhizobium bacteria and only to their use in inoculating leguminous plants.126
If patentable subject matter restrictions were truly driven by concerns about
breadth, preemptive or otherwise, the patentability of Bond's inoculant
presumably would have risen or fallen on the question of whether its patent's
limitations adequately narrowed its scope. Instead, the Supreme Court brushed
Kalo Inoculant Company's claim limitations aside as "hardly more than an
advance in the packaging of the inoculants."1 27
preempt the mathematical formula,' since there are uses of his formula outside the petrochemical
and oil-refining industries that remain in the public domain."); see also Strandburg, supra note 62,
at 585-86, 588-89 (discussing per se exclusions).
120. Dreyfuss & Evans, supra note 68, at 1371-72.
121. See Alice Corp. Pty., Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2358-59 (2014); Mayo
Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1298 (2012); Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S.
Ct. 3218, 3230 (2010); Flook, 437 U.S. at 590; Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 659
F.3d 1057, 1067 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (quoting Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3225, 3230).
122. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 132 S. Ct. at 1298; Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3230 (quoting Diehr,
450 U.S. at 191 (1981)); Flook, 437 U.S. at 590.
123. See Flook, 437 U.S. at 590; Classen Immunotherapies, Inc., 659 F.3d at 1067; In re
Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 963 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc); In re Grams, 888 F.2d 835, 839-41 (Fed. Cir.
1989); In re Meyer, 688 F.2d 789, 794 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (citing In re Richman, 563 F.2d 1026
(C.C.P.A. 1977)).
124. CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2011); see
also In re Meyer, 688 F.2d at 795 n.3 (holding appellants' apparatus claims not to differ from
method claims).
125. See CLS Bank Int'l v. Alice Corp. Pty., 717 F.3d 1269, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2013); Bancorp
Servs. v. Sun Life Assurance, 687 F.3d 1266, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2012); see also SiRF Tech., Inc. v.
Int'l Trade Comm'n, 601 F.3d 1319, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2010) ("[F]or the addition of a machine to
impose a meaningful limit on the scope of a claim, it must play a significant part in permitting the
claimed method to be performed, rather than function solely as an obvious mechanism for
permitting a solution to be achieved more quickly[.]"); In re Meyer, 688 F.2d at 795 n.3; see
generally Bernard Chao, Finding the Point of Novelty in Software Patents, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.
REv. 1217 (2013) (discussing patent eligibility determinations for software patents).
126. Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948); see also
Strandburg, supra note 62, at 583 (remarking on the narrowness of the Funk patent).
127. Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 131.
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Again, if preempting future inventive efforts were truly a concern, why not
allow claims to phenomena of nature, laws of nature, or abstract ideas if the
claims added adequate scope narrowing limitations, no matter how token or
conventional those limitations might be? To be sure, limitations such as field of
use restrictions, data gathering steps, or means plus function machine elements
may not do much to narrow claim scope because those limitations are phrased in
such broad or functional terms, 128 but they are still limiting. The patent system's
characterization and disapproval of some limitations as token or insignificant
attest to the fact that patentable subject matter is not about claim breadth, much
less preemptive breadth. Indeed, courts make this fact clear. 129 The term
preemption as used in relation to patentable subject matter determinations refers
not to the breadth of future inventive or research efforts on which a patent might
encroach. Rather, the concern is about preempting-that is, patenting-the
unpatentable subject matter itself. "Why not permit patentees to avoid overbroad
pre-emption by limiting claim scope to particular fields of use? This tension is
resolved, however by recalling the purpose behind the Supreme Court's
discussion of pre-emption, namely that pre-emption is merely an indication that a
claim seeks to cover a fundamental principle itself rather than only a specific
application of that principle. 3 0 In other words, courts must first identify whether
an invention involves a phenomenon, law of nature, or an abstract idea with the
question of "preemption" then becoming an inquiry solely into whether the
invention adds anything else.' 3 ' Preemptive effects on future innovation thus
plays no role in either identifying the unpatentable subject matter as such or,
more importantly, explaining why it is unpatentable.
Moreover, in deciding whether a limitation is "meaningful,"
"substantive,"132 and "actually limiting in the sense required under § 101,"133 the
courts are looking for something that is not just scope limiting but also
technological in nature. The courts refer to this technological quality in various
ways: whether the limitations meaningfully restrict the claim as a whole to "an
128. See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3231 (2010) (citing Flook, 437 U.S. at 593); In re
Abele, 684 F.2d 902, 909 (C.C.P.A. 1982); In re Grams, 888 F.2d at 839-40 (quoting In re
Christensen, 478 F.2d 1392, 1394 (C.C.P.A. 1973); In re Sarkar, 588 F.2d 1330, 1335 (C.C.P.A.
1978)).
129. See, e.g., CLS Bank Int'l, 717 F.3d at 1281; In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 957 (Fed. Cir.
2008) (en banc); Arrhythmia Res. Tech. v. Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d 1053, 1057 (Fed. Cir. 1992);
In re Walter, 618 F.2d 758, 767 (C.C.P.A. 1980); see also Strandburg, supra note 62, at 566
(pointing out that the Supreme Court's decisions do not turn on claim breadth).
130. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 957; accord Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., 132
S. Ct. 1289, 1294 (2012); CLSBankInt'l, 717 F.3d at 1281 ("[T]he animating concern is that claims
should not be coextensive with a natural law, natural phenomenon, or abstract idea.").
131. Accenture Global Servs., GmbH v. Guidewire Software, Inc., 728 F.3d 1336, 1341 (Fed.
Cir. 2013) (citing CLS Bank Int'l, 717 F.3d at 1282); Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 722 F.3d
1335, 1354-55 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (Lourie, J., concurring) (quoting CLSBankInt'l, 717 F.3d at 1282).
132. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2360 (2014) (quoting CLS Bank
Int'l, 717 F.3d at 1291).
133. CLSBankInt'l, 717 F.3d at 1282, 1291 (emphasis added).
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application;" 3 4 whether those limitations provide some "'significant 'inventive
concept;""1 35 or whether the limitations lead to creative value rather than
narrowed scope.136 As the Supreme Court recently explained in Alice Corp Pty.,
Ltd. v. CLS Bank Ltd., patentable subject matter depends on whether the claimed
invention evinces some "technological" improvement or advance. 137
Furthermore, if the courts were truly concerned about policing potential
disproportionality between a claimed invention's technological value and its
preemptive scope, why would they look to patentable subject matter restrictions
to do so? The patentability requirements of novelty, non-obviousness, utility,
and full disclosure (particularly enablement) "serve a critical role in adjusting the
ever present tension in patent law between stimulating innovation by protecting
inventors, and impeding progress by granting patents when not justified by the
statutory design."13 8 The patent system uses the requirements of novelty, non-
obviousness, utility, enablement, definiteness, and even written description to
tailor patent breadth to what the claimed invention actually contributes to its
art.1
39
In fact, the patentability requirements are arguably better suited than
patentable subject matter restrictions for examining technological contribution
and cabining patent breadth.140  Novelty, non-obviousness, utility, and
enablement look explicitly at whether an invention contributes anything to
technological progress. If an invention is already available to the public via the
prior art and therefore lacks novelty, or if an invention is so readily within
society's grasp that it is obvious, the invention contributes nothing to
technological progress. 141 The patentability requirements thus protect
134. Mayo Collaborative Servs. 132 S. Ct. at, 1297-98 (quoting Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct.
3218, 3231 (2010); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 590 (1978)); Accenture Global Services, GmbH,
728 F.3d at 1344-45 (quoting CLS Bank Int'l, 717 F.3d at 1282); Ultramercial, Inc., 722 F.3d at
1344.
135. Alice Corp., 134 S. Ct. at 2357 (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs., 132 S. Ct. at 1294);
Flook, 437 U.S. at 594; CLS Bank Int'l, 717 F.3d at 1291.
136. Lemley et al., supra note 88, at 1330; Michael Risch, A Suprisingly Useful Requirement,
19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 57, 78-81 (2011) (citations omitted).
137. Alice Corp., 134 S. Ct. at 2359-60 (citing Mayo Collaborative, 132 S. Ct. at 1297-98);
accord Bancorp Servs. v. Sun Life Assurance, 687 F.3d 1266, 1279 (2012) (citing Research Corp.
Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 627 F.3d 859, 869 (Fed. Cir. 2010)).
138. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3229; accord Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 41-42; Strandburg, supra
note 62, at 576.
139. Burk & Lemley, supra note 99, 1656-57; Duffy, supra note 5, at 615, 623; Eisenberg,
supra note 6, at 26-27; Lemley et al., supra note 88, at 1326-27; Risch, supra note 30, 591-93.
140. See, e.g., In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 1015 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc) (Rader, J.,
dissenting) ("These statutory conditions and requirements better serve the function of screening out
unpatentable inventions than [section 101]"); see also Dennis Crouch & Robert P. Merges,
Operating Efficiently Post-Bilski by Ordering Patent Doctrine Decision-Making, 25 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1673, 1688 (2010) (explaining that "patentability doctrines are each distinct in some
form, they still overlap in many, often complex, ways.").
141. See 35 U.S.C. §102(a) (2012) (requiring novelty); 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012) (requiring non-
obviousness).
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specifically against patent claims whose contributions to their arts are limited.142
The novelty and non-obviousness requirements also do so in a more nuanced
manner by looking at the merits of each invention in relation to its relevant art; 143
patentable subject matter, by contrast, does not employ the benefit of prior art in
measuring an invention's technological value.
Likewise, the patentability requirements of enablement, definiteness, and
written description do a better job at narrowing patent scope and tailoring it to
technological contribution.1 44  The enablement requirement under section 112
requires that a patent describe the claimed invention in "such full, clear, concise,
and exact terms" that a skilled practitioner in the field could use that description
both to make and to use the invention.1 45  A patent that enables a relatively
narrow range of embodiments enjoys narrow claim scope.146 The written
description requirement, also under section 112, demands that patentees describe
their claimed inventions in enough detail to prove that they technically possess
the full scope of their patent claims.147 Even the requirement of claim
definiteness under section 112 protects against patent overbreadth by
invalidating claims that are so vague that the boundaries of the claim cannot be
determined.1 48  The more specific and concrete the inventive concept, the
narrower the patent on it tends to be.1 49
To some extent, patentable subject matter restrictions may overlap with the
patentability requirements, and many patentable subject matter decisions use
language that invokes novelty, non-obviousness, utility, and so on. 50 Indeed,
142. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3229; Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 42 (citing 35 U.S.C. §§ 102-103
(2010)); see also State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Sig. Fin. Grp., Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1377 (Fed. Cir.
1998) ("Whether the patent's claims are too broad to be patentable is not to be judged under § 101,
but rather under §§ 102, 103 and 112.").
143. See generally Burk & Lemley, supra note 99 (discussing the many ways in which a court
may tailor patent law).
144. Merges & Nelson, supra note 69, at 848.
145. 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012).
146. Chiang, supra note 58, at 1222; see Chiappetta, supra note 103, at 164.
147. 35 U.S.C. § 112(a); see also Jeremy A. Lefstin, The Formal Structure ofPatent Law and
the Limits of Enablement, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1141, 1154-56 (2008); Michael Risch, A Brief
Defense of the Written Description Requirement, 119 YALE L.J. ONLINE 127, 138-42 (2010)
(citations omitted).
148. 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) (2012); see also In re Musgrave, 431 F.2d 882, 893 (C.C.P.A. 1970)
(holding that claims involving subjective human judgment may be indefinite); Carl A. Kukkonen,
Be a Good Sport and Refrain from Using My Patented Putt: Intellectual Property Protection for
Sports Related Movements, J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 808, 823-24 (1998) (noting
indefiniteness of sports method patents).
149. Lemley et al., supra note 88, at 1334-35. Concerns about preemptive effects on future
inventors can also be addressed through means other than patentability, such as the reverse doctrine
of equivalents and an experimental-use exception. See Burk, supra note 109, at 154-58 (citations
omitted); Chisum, supra note 33, at 1017-18; Merges & Nelson, supra note 69, at 862 (quoting
Borg-Warner Corp. v. Paragon Gear Works, 355 F.2d 400, 404 (1st Cir. 1965); Strandburg, supra
note 62, at 596 (quoting Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 590 (1978)).
150. See, e.g., In re Bergstrom, 427 F.2d 1394, 1401 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (explicitly equating
"new" under section 101 with novelty under section 102); Merck & Co. v. Olin Mathieson Chem.
82 [VOL. 66: 61
INTUITIVE PATENTING
some commentators argue that patentability requirements such as utility and
novelty would serve much better than patentable subject matter restrictions to
distinguish patentable from unpatentable technology.'' As the courts have
repeatedly made clear, however, patentable subject matter law looks at different
factors and does different work than do the patentability requirements.12
Take for example, the apparent overlap between patentable subject matter
and enablement. As the majority in Bilski mentioned, some claimed inventions
such as business methods may be so vague, conceptual, and nonspecific that
their bounds are inevitably broad, but their technological contributions are
uncertain and vague. 5 3 For example, many patentable subject matter cases cite
to the famous case of O'Reilly v. Morse, involving Samuel Morse's patent on his
invention of the telegraph.1 54 Morse's patent included an extremely broad eighth
claim for the use of "electromagnetism, however developed for marking or
printing intelligible characters, signs, or letters, at any distances," even though
Morse's telegraph was clearly only one embodiment of the possible ways in
which someone might use electromagnetism to send long distance messages.i15
The Supreme Court invalidated the eighth claim, explaining that it was too broad
because "[Morse] claims an exclusive right to use a manner and process which
he has not described and indeed had not invented," specifically citing to the
enablement requirement as it existed in the 1836 Patent Act.156 Morse's claim
can therefore be fairly characterized as one that failed both patentable subject
matter restrictions and the enablement requirement.
Corp., 253 F.2d 156, 164 (4th Cir. 1958) (applying only novelty and utility requirements); see also
Efthimios Parasidis, A Uniform Framework for Patent Eligibility, 85 TUL. L. REV. 323, 351 (2010)
(noting this phenomenon); Burton T. Ong, Patenting the Biological Bounty of Nature: Re-
Examining the Status of Organic Inventions as Patentable Subject Matter, 8 MARQ. INTELL. PROP.
L. REV. 1, 23 (2004) (same).
151. E.g., Kristen Osenga, Ants, Elephant Guns, and Statutory Subject Matter, 39 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 1087 (2007); Risch, supra note 30, at 637; David Kappos, Some Thoughts on Patentability,
Director's Forum: A Blog from USPTO's Leadership, U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off (July 27, 2012),
http://www.uspto.gov/blog/director/entry/some thoughts onjpatentability.
152. See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1303-04 (2012)
(citations omitted); Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 190 (1981) (quoting In re Bergy, 596 F.2d
952, 961 (C.C.P.A. 1979); S. Rep. No. 82-1979, at 5, 6, 17 (1952)); Flook, 437 U.S. at 588; In re
Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 958 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc) (quoting Diehr, 450 U.S. at 188-91; Flook, 437
U.S. at 594); see also Eisenberg, supra note 6, 50-60 (citing 35 U.S.C. §§ 102-103, 112 (2010))
(comparing patentable subject matter restrictions with patentability requirements).
153. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3229 (2010); see also BESSEN & MEURER, supra note
115, at 56-62 (2008) (citations omitted) (noting that some types of subject matter are more prone to
vague and overbroad claims); Collins, Bilski, supra note 6, at 50-53 (citations omitted) (same).
154. E.g., Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3253 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing O'Reilly v. Morse, 56
U.S. (15 How.) 62, 113 (1853)); Flook, 437 U.S. at 592 (quoting and citing Morse, 56 U.S. (15
How.) at 115); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 68 (1972) (quoting and citing Morse, 56 U.S. (15
How.) at 111-13).
155. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) at 112.
156. Id. at 113.
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The vagueness of a patent claim is a separate issue from the abstraction of its
subject matter, however.1 7  The former is an issue of enablement or lack
therefore, whereas the latter is an issue of patentable subject matter. 5 8  To
understand this distinction, one need only look at the number of claimed
inventions-such as business methods, mathematical algorithms, and laws of
nature-that are quite specific, fully enabled, and yet rejected as abstract
ideas.1 59 Justice Stevens' concurrence in Bilski, for example, noted that the risk
hedging method at issue in that case was neither a vague statement of abstract
principles or fundamental truths nor lacking in specificity, but was nonetheless
an unpatentable abstract idea.160 As Justice Stevens explained, "claim
specification is covered by section 112, not section 101; and if a series of steps
constituted an unpatentable idea merely because it was described without
sufficient specificity, the Court could be calling into question some of our own
prior decisions."161 Were vagueness and ambiguity truly the defining
characteristic for why abstract ideas are unpatentable, moreover, the useful,
concrete, and tangible test and its sole focus on specificity and utility likely
would have curried more favor.1 62
Similar analyses distinguish novelty, non-obviousness, and utility from
patentable subject matter restrictions. Mathematical formulas may be both novel
and useful, yet still be unpatentable laws of nature. 16 Discoveries of natural
phenomena may be both novel and non-obvious, yet still be unpatentable subject
matter.164 Novelty and non-obviousness depend not only on prior art but also on
the "Person Having Ordinary Skill In The Art" (PHOSITA) standard, or what a
PHOSITA would find enabled by or obvious over the prior, as do the utility and
enablement requirements.165 Subject matter restrictions, by contrast, do not look
157. Collins, Bilski, supra note 6, at 51-53 (quoting Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45
F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930)) (citing Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548
U.S. 124, 134 (2006); Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) at 113; In re Gorman, 933 F.2d 982, 987 (Fed. Cir.
1991)).
158. See Chisum, supra note 40, at 20 (quoting In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir.
1988)) (citing Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) at 62); Risch, supra note 30, at 600-02 (citations omitted).
159. See, e.g., Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1303 (2012)
(noting that the unpatentable law of nature at issue in the case was both "narrow and specific"); see
also Collins, supra note 87, at 21-22 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012)) (noting that disclosure
doctrines do not prevent the patenting of information as abstract ideas).
160. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3235 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring).
161. Id. at 3235-36.
162. See supra text accompanying notes 104-115.
163. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 585 (1978) (explaining the holding in Gottschalk v.
Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67-68 (1972)).
164. Lab. Corp. v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 126-27 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(citations omitted); Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 132 (1948).
165. Burk & Lemley, supra note 99, at 1648-51 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012)) (citing
35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012); Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 609
(1950); Exxon Res. & Eng'g Co. v. U.S., 265 F.3d 1371, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2001)).
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at either the prior art or the PHOSITA standard.1 66 A particular piece of music,
for example, is clearly unpatentable subject matter, not because the music lacks
novelty or non-obviousness, analyses to which music does not lend itself in any
event, but because music is simply unpatentable. 167
In fact, patentable subject matter does not specifically look at a claimed
invention's contribution to its art or at the scope of embodiments covered at all.
It is the patentability requirements that measure technological value and cabin
patent scope, but subject matter restrictions perform some other function.168
Whereas novelty, non-obviousness, and the other patentability requirements are
designed to weed out inventions whose progress inhibiting breadth outweighs
their progress promoting contributions, the patentability requirements do not
distinguish patentable inventions from unpatentable discoveries or abstract
ideas.169 To the extent that patent law excludes phenomena of nature, laws of
nature, and abstract ideas from patentability and perhaps more importantly, for
whatever reasons that patent law does so-only patentable subject matter does
the actual work.
In the end, patentable subject matter restrictions have little correlation with
overbreadth and the risk of preemption.1 70 This is not to say that preemption,
patent anticommons and thickets, and other holdups are not a problem in the
patent system; the point here is only that as actually applied, patentable subject
matter restrictions do little to address these problems. Unlike inquiries into
whether patentability requirements have been met, patentable subject matter
determinations do not look at the balance between hindering and promoting
technological progress when the invention is clearly within section 101's four
categories of included subject matter. The courts even admit as much,
acknowledging that overbreadth is the symptom, not the disease, when it comes
to patentable subject matter.' 7 ' "[P]re-emption is merely an indication that a
claim seeks to cover a fundamental principle itself rather than only a specific
application of that principle."1 72 What distinguishes phenomena of nature from
166. See generally Gerard N. Magliocca, Patenting the Curve Ball: Business Methods and
Industry Norms, 2009 BYU L. Rev. 875, 877 (arguing that patentable subject matter ought to
employ a PHOSITA-like standard for processes).
167. In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1554 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
168. Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 8; Strandburg, supra note 62, at 580 (citing Dreyfuss &
Evans, supra note 54, at 1359-6 1).
169. Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 54-56; Strandburg, supra note 62, at 606.
170. Strandburg, supra note 62, at 588. But see Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 56-61 (arguing that
patentable subject matter may impose some vague restraints on claim overbreadth).
171. Id. at 566, 613.
172. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 957 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc) (citing Diamond v. Diehr, 450
U.S. 175, 187 (1981); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71-72 (1972)); accord CLS Bank Int'l v.
Alice Corp. Pty., 717 F.3d 1269, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2013); Arrhythmia Res. Tech. v. Corazonix Corp.
958 F.2d 1053, 1057 (Fed. Cir. 1992); In re Walter, 618 F.2d 758, 767 (C.C.P.A. 1980); see also
Strandburg, supra note 62, at 566 (criticizing the preemption rationale).
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patentable subject matter seems to be some other, more intuitive sense of what
patentable technology is.173
B. The Unpatentability ofKnowledge and Information Rationale
Another rationale sometimes cited in patentable subject matter cases is that
phenomena of nature, laws of nature, and abstract ideas are all "part of the
storehouse of knowledge of all men . .. free to all men and reserved exclusively
to none." 74 That is to say, phenomena of nature, laws of nature, and abstract
ideas are all forms of knowledge, loosely defined, they are "scientific truths,"
"ideas," "principles," and "fundamental truths," and therefore not the kind of
subject matter that can be patentable.1 75 Professor Collins explains this as the
fact that "information qua information" is not patentable.1 76  Although
applications of knowledge are patentable, knowledge and information singularly
are not. 7 7  Knowledge may be just too important to be deemed property, as
reflected in the bars on copyrighting or trademarking information and facts. 78
Rationalizing the categories of unpatentable subject matter on the idea that
knowledge and information are unpatentable is a bit of a straw man, however. It
is more of an assertion than an explanation, and a rather vague assertion at that.
Not everything that is unpatentable subject matter can be classified as
information or knowledge strictly speaking, and things that could be classified as
knowledge are patentable subject matter. It all depends on what we consider to
be knowledge.
For instance, laws of nature and abstract ideas can fairly easily be
characterized as types of knowledge, but phenomena of nature are a little more
difficult to visualize as knowledge. Laws of nature are observable principles and
precepts that define the relationships between natural forces and materials, such
as Newton's law of universal gravitation or Einstein's law of special relativity;179
mathematical algorithms are also sometimes referred to as laws of nature.8 o As
the Court noted in Prometheus, "a patent that simply describes [a naturally
173. Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 7; Strandburg, supra note 62, at 566-67 (citations omitted).
174. Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948); accord Lab. Corp.
v. Metabolite Labs, Inc. 548 U.S. 124, 127-28 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari).
175. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972) (quoting Mackay Radio & Tel. Co. v.
Radio Corp., 306 U.S. 86, 94 (1939); Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 156, 175 (1853); Rubber-Tip
Pencil Co. v. Howard, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 498, 507 (1874)).
176. See generally Collins, supra note 87, at 12 (analyzing the patentability of information).
177. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188 (1981) (quoting Mackay Radio, 306 U.S. at 94).
178. See, e.g., Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 127 (2006)
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 305 (2003)) (noting patent law's exclusion of
scientific and mathematical information as analogous to copyright's exclusion of "ideas").
179. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293 (2012).
180. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 214-15; see also Mackay Radio, 306 U.S. at 94 (referring to the
mathematical expression at issue as a "scientific truth").
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occurring] relation sets forth a natural law."'' Likewise, the abstract idea
category has been used to exclude mental processes, legal and economic
theories, data, music, and other descriptive or expressive materials. 8 2  Most
claimed inventions that have been excluded as unpatentable phenomena of
nature, on the other hand, are not information about naturally occurring objects
but rather the objects themselves Rhizobium bacteria,' 83 tungsten, 8 4 and citrus
fruit,' for example. Genetic material clearly serves double duty as both a
naturally occurring object and information, 8 6 but otherwise, the definition of
knowledge has to be stretched a bit to accommodate phenomena of nature. A
patent on an object can prevent others from studying the object, so perhaps
natural phenomena are unpatentable because of the information embodied in the
phenomenon itself.8 7  Indeed, courts often do not distinguish between
phenomena of nature and the laws of nature they embody.'
This latter line of reasoning argues too much, however. All patents have the
potential to obstruct the study of their covered subject matter. 89 To be sure, a
patent is also required to provide a written description of the claimed invention,
to disclose the manner and process of making and using it, and to claim it in a
way that particularly points out and distinctly claims its subject matter.' 90 This
required disclosure may omit a great deal of potentially useful information about
the invention, however, such as how and why it works, how it might interact and
be used with other technologies, how it could be developed into other
technologies, and so on. Others may therefore wish to have access to the
181. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 132 S. Ct. at 1297 (emphasis added).
182. See MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2106.01, at 2100-17 to -18 (8th ed.,
rev. 2006) [hereinafter MPEP] (citations omitted); see also Burk, supra note 109, at 141-142 (citing
In re Russell, 48 F.2d 668, 669 (C.C.P.A. 1931)) (noting that mental processes and expressive
materials are unpatentable).
183. Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 131 (1948).
184. Gen. Elec. Co. v. De Forest Radio Co., 28 F.2d 641, 642 (3d Cir. 1928).
185. Am. Fruit Growers v. Brogdex Co., 283 U.S. 11-12 (1931) (citing Hartranft v.
Wiegmann, 121 U.S. 609, 613, 615 (1887)). For the sake of exposition, this Article treats laws of
nature and phenomena of nature as if they were distinguishable by their informational content. For
example, while gravitational force can be viewed as a physical phenomenon of nature, the law of
gravity can be viewed as a law of nature that defines how the gravitational force acts on objects
within its reach.
186. Ass'n Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2111-12, 2116-18
(2013) (citing Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 305, 209-10 (1980); Funk Bros. Seed Co.,
333 U. S. at 128-30, 132).
187. Indeed, the only way to patent some types of information about an object may be to
patent the object itself. See Collins, supra note 87, at 12 (citing Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186,
216 (2003)); Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 51-52.
188. E.g., Funk Bros. Seed Co., 333 U.S. at 130-31 (referring to product claim on bacteria
variously as a "phenomenon of nature," "law of nature," and "natural principle"); see also Lab.
Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 134, 137 (2006) (referring to natural
correlation at issue alternately as both a "natural phenomenon" and a "natural law").
189. See Katherine J. Strandburg, What Does the Public Get? Experimental Use and the
Patent Bargain, 2004 Wis. L. REV. 81, 102.
190. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2012).
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claimed invention itself in order to study it in more depth, but because modem
U.S. patent law has an extremely limited experimental use exception, others may
have to wait until patent expiration to be able to study what knowledge an
invention may have to reveal.191
Moreover, to the extent that patents do disclose information about the
claimed invention, a patent grants exclusive right over that information at least
for the purposes of making, using, selling, or offering to sell the claimed
invention.1 92 In this limited sense, information and knowledge are patentable.
Again, patents do not protect the concrete or tangible embodiments of an
invention, but rather the inventive concept behind it.' 93 As Professor Wagner
explained in his article, "[i]n the context of intellectual property, the subject
matter to be controlled is information: expression in the case of copyrights, [and]
(applied) ideas in the case of patents."194 This is particularly true for process
claims, which are in effect simply step-by-step information on, and algorithms
for, accomplishing a particular technological task.1 95 Much of what could be
considered knowledge or information is in fact patentable subject matter.1 96 It is
perhaps for this reason that knowledge and information are not explicit
categories of exclusion. 197 If phenomena and laws of nature, or even other
excluded categories, were unpatentable because they are unpatentable
information and knowledge, then patentable subject matter law would
presumably state up front that information and knowledge cannot be patented.
That being said, some types of information and knowledge clearly are
unpatentable subject matter. Again, expressive or descriptive materials or other
printed matter that performs no function has never been considered patentable
subject matter.1 98 The Supreme Court in Prometheus invalidated the claimed
drug dosage adjustment method at issue as an unpatentable law of nature because
it merely described the correlation between a patient's metabolite levels and the
191. Strandburg, supra note 189, at 102.
192. See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2012); see also Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe, Inc., 323 F.3d.
956, 981 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (Rader, J. dissenting) (noting that competitors must wait until expiration
to use patents' enabling disclosures to use, exploit, or commercialize the claimed inventions).
193. See Duffy, supra note 5, at 642 (quoting ROBINSON, supra note 41, § 134, at 190-91);
Durham, supra note 41, at 843-44; Morris, supra note 41, at 498.
194. R. Polk Wagner, Information Wants to Be Free: Intellectual Property and the
Mythologies of Control, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 995, 998 (2003).
195. See, e.g., Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 219 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting
that almost any process can be described as an unpatentable algorithm or law of nature); In re
Freeman, 573 F.2d 1237, 1245-46 (1978) (quoting MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE
DICTIONARY 28 (10th ed. 2000)) (same); Chisum, supra note 36, at 975 (noting broad definition of
algorithms and their overlap with "processes").
196. Collins, supra note 87, at 11 ("The breadth or polyvalency of the concept of information
suggests that many things that we currently treat as patentable, if not all of them, are also
information.").
197. Id. at 25 (citing Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 216 (2003)).
198. MPEP, supra note 182, § 2106.01, at 2100-17; see also Burk, supra note 109, at 141-42
(citing In re Russell, 48 F.2d 668, 669 (C.C.P.A. 1931)).
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effective dose of thiopurine.' 99 Furthermore, in Gottschalk v. Benson, the Court
rejected a computerized method for converting binary coded decimal numbers
into pure binary numbers as an attempt to patent a mathematical algorithm
itself.200  Basic economic or legal theories, mental activities such as
observations, evaluations, or opinions, teaching concepts, and instructions for
business methods have also all been held to be unpatentable types of information
and knowledge.2 0 '
Why are these types of information unpatentable subject matter? Much of
the information and knowledge rejected as unpatentable subject matter is novel,
non-obvious, and quite useful. 202 Once again, much of the excluded types of
information and knowledge also serve to promote significant progress in useful
203
arts. Both courts and commentators have offered a variety of reasons why
certain types of knowledge and information are nonetheless unpatentable subject
matter.
A number of cases fall back on the preemption argument, describing
knowledge and information as "basic tools of scientific and technological
work," 204 and that patents on such knowledge would "inhibit further discovery
by improperly tying up the future use."205 This argument fails for all the reasons
206discussed in the previous section.
A variation on the preemption argument expressed in some cases is the
concern that patents on phenomena and laws of nature or abstract ideas would
impede further research and acquisition of knowledge.207 Again, this argument
199. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1297 (2012).
200. Gotttschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71 (1972).
201. MPEP, supra note 182, § 2106, at 2100-17; Interim Guidance for Determining Subject
Matter Eligibility for Process Claims in View of Bilski v. Kappos, 75 Fed. Reg. 43,922, 43,926
(July 27, 2010) (citing Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3224, 3229, 3230, 3231, 3248 (2010)),
available athttp://www.uspto.gov/patents/law/exam/bilski guidance 27jul2010.pdf.
202. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 132 S. Ct. at 1303 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting and citing
35 U.S.C. §§ 102-103, 112 (2012)); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 585, 588 (1978); Funk Bros.
Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 131 (1948); see also Karjala, supra note 11, at 448-
49; Dennis S. Karjala, A Coherent Theory for the Copyright Protection of Computer Software and
Recent Judicial Interpretations, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 53, 56-58 (1997) (noting that descriptive
material is often useful).
203. See supra text accompanying notes 76-80; Kevin Emerson Collins, Propertizing
Thought, 60 SMU L. REV. 317, 345-46 (2007) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8).
204. Benson, 409 U.S. at 67; accord Mayo Collaborative Servs., 132 S. Ct. at 1301 (quoting
Benson, 409 U.S. at 67); Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3253 (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting Benson, 409
U.S. at 67); see also Collins, supra note 87, at 17 (discussing the "basic tools" rationale).
205. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 132 S. Ct. at 1301; see also Collins, supra note 87, at 349
(quoting Benson, 409 U.S. at 71-72).
206. See supra Part II. A.
207. E.g., Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 128 (2006)
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (holding that such preemption might discourage development); Miriam
Bitton, Patenting Abstractions, 15 N.C. J. L. & TECH. 153, 209 (2014) (same); Eisenberg, supra
note 6, at 12 (quoting Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 548 U.S. at 127) (same); Rebecca S. Eisenberg,
Proprietary Rights and the Norms of Science in Bio-Technology Research, 97 YALE L.J. 177, 184
(1987) (same).
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also fails because it argues too much and would cover both patentable and
unpatentable subject matter.208 The research argument also argues too little, as
much of what are unpatentable abstract ideas-such as business methods, much
computer software, and expression-cannot reasonably be considered tools or
objects of scientific research.209 And if freedom to pursue further research and
further knowledge were actually a driving concern behind the patent system, it
would seem logical to allow a much more robust experimental use exception
than U.S. patent law currently does, regardless of the subject matter in
*210question.
A slightly more worrisome concern is that patents on knowledge and
scientific fact pose the risk of involuntary infringement.21 To the degree that
phenomena of nature embody knowledge or are the objects of research into
natural principles, patents on things like genes, cell lines, and proteins might lead
212to involuntary infringement by those who naturally possess them. Mental
processes patents are particularly suspect, as one cannot easily avoid
213infringement by remembering not to think about something. Patent law
demonstrates a noticeable discomfort with patenting anything that could
constitute human thought: "mental processes-or processes of human thinking-
standing alone are not patentable even if they have practical application." 214
The discomfort with patenting human mental processes or elements of
human biology comes with good reason. Patents on human thought or human
activity and attempts to patent humans themselves constrain the freedom to think
certain thoughts or perform certain activities, and as a result may contravene the
First or even Thirteenth Amendments or other express guarantees of various
215freedoms. Patenting information or knowledge may therefore be
208. See supra text accompanying notes 204-06.
209. Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 12-13.
210. See generally Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive
Rights and Experiment Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1029 (1989) (discussing the lack of an
experimental-use exception in the U.S. patent system); Strandburg, supra note 189 (same).
211. See Kevin Emerson Collins, Constructive Nonvolition in Patent Law and the Problem of
Insufficient Thought Control, 2007 Wis. L. REV. 759; Alan L. Durham, Natural Laws and
Inevitable Infringement, 93 MINN. L. REV. 933 (2009); Andrew W. Torrance, Neurobiology and
Patenting Thought, 50 IDEA 27 (2009).
212. See Collins, supra note 211, at 760-61; Durham, supra note 211, at 934-35; Torrance,
supra note 211, at 40.
213. Collins, supra note 211, at 760-62 (citations omitted); Torrance, supra note 211, at 29;
see also Pamela Samuelson, Benon Revisited: The Case Against Patent Protection for Algorithms
and Other Computer Program-Related Inventions, 39 EMORY L.J. 1025, 1034-35 (1990) (outlining
the mental steps doctrine).
214. In re Comiskey, 544 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed. Cir. 2009); accord In re Warmerdam, 33 F.3d
1354, 1359-60 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
215. Dan L. Burk, The Problem of Process in Biotechnology, 43 Hous. L. REV. 561, 571
(2006); Margo A. Bagley, Patent First, Ask Questions Later: Morality and Biotechnology in Patent
Law, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 469, 501-04 (2003) (citations omitted); Andrew W. Torrance,
Physiological Steps Doctrine, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1471, 1505 n.213 (2008) (citing Burk,
supra note 109, at 139-140).
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fundamentally different in the threat that it would pose to freedom of thought,
particularly given patent law's strict liability regime.2 16
In Laboratory Corp. of America Holdings v. Metabolite Laboratories, Inc.,
for example, the patentee claimed a process of diagnosing cobalamin or folate
vitamin deficiencies in warm-blooded animals by observing the levels of the
amino acid homocysteine in the animals' blood.21  Metabolite Laboratories then
sued LabCorp, alleging not that LabCorp's homocysteine assays themselves had
infringed the claim but rather that the doctors who used the assays to diagnose
vitamin deficiencies had infringed, making LabCorp secondarily liable for
inducing infringement.21 Thus, the underlying argument was that because the
correlation between homocysteine and vitamin deficiency had become well
known, infringement would "occur automatically in the mind of any competent
physician."219 Although LabCorp never expressly challenged the claim as
unpatentable subject matter, the claim nicely illustrates the risk of involuntary
infringement posed by patents on some types of information.220
Not all unpatentable information poses a risk of involuntary infringement,
however. Many things that have been rejected as unpatentable abstract ideas
such as legal and economic methods, databases, expressive or descriptive
content, and even complex mathematical algorithms-are too complex or
sophisticated to be liable to automatic, involuntary thought.22 1 Most people have
difficulty forcing themselves to think through complicated mathematical
algorithms or economic theories; involuntary thought is hardly a risk.222 Many
types of information and knowledge thus might be unintentionally infringed, but
involuntary infringement is less likely.223
More importantly, concerns about involuntary infringement are easily
circumvented. For decades, patentees have attempted to avoid the risk of
involuntary infringement by limiting their patent claims on naturally occurring
products to only their non-naturally occurring forms. Limiting patents to only
the isolated, purified, or in vitro forms, for example, both narrows scope and
216. Collins, supra note 211, at 761 (quoting Jurgens v. CBK, Ltd., 80 F.3d 1566, 1570 n.2
(Fed. Cir. 1996)).
217. 548 U.S. 124, 129 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
218. Id. at 129-30.
219. Id.
220. See Collins, supra note 211, at 761-62 (citing Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 548 U.S. at
125-26); Durham, supra note 211, at 934-45. But see Torrance, supra note 211, at 42 (suggesting
that doctors might have been able to control whether they infringe Metabolite's diagnostic method).
221. Collins, supra note 211, at 331 n.48. Indeed, some types of information simply cannot be
processed by the human mind. See Richard S. Gruner, Better Living Through Software: Promoting
Information Processing Advances Through Patent Incentives, 74 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 977, 1038
(2000).
222. Along the same lines, perhaps someone with an eidetic memory could infringe a patent
on War and Peace, but even then, "thinking" Tolstoy's famous novel would undoubtedly be subject
to volitional control.
223. See Collins, supra note 211, at 763-64 (noting difference between unintentional and
involuntary infringement); Torrance, supra note 211, at 40-41 (citations omitted) (same).
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224
obviates the risk of involuntary infringement. Likewise, limiting a claim to an
algorithm or other information to only its use in conjunction with other
affirmative actions, materials, or apparatuses such as computers avoids the risk
225
of involuntary infringement.
In fact, the scope limiting effects of machine or apparatus limitations led to
226the rejection-at least temporarily of the mental steps doctrine. The mental
steps doctrine stated, in essence, that an invention distinguished from the prior
art only by the addition of an algorithm or other information processing steps
was unpatentable as "purely mental in character."227 The Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals (C.C.P.A.) later rejected this strict stance in a case called In re
Prater, explaining that algorithms or other information limited to a general
purpose digital computer, a special purpose analog device, or their equivalents is
not a mental step but in fact a machine that "quite clear[ly] . . . does not
encompass the human being as the 'means' or any part thereof." 9 The mere act
of thinking about information, involuntary or otherwise, cannot infringe a
230
machine or apparatus claim.
The Supreme Court never directly opined on the C.C.P.A.'s brief
experimentation with the mental steps doctrine, but the Court's opinions make
clear that patentable subject matter depends on much more than simply avoiding
the risk of involuntary infringement. The Supreme Court's decision in
Gottschalk v. Benson is a case in point.231 The patent at issue claimed methods
for increasing the efficiency of a digital computer with an algorithm for
converting binary coded decimal numerals into pure binary numbers.232 The
PTO had rejected the methods as unpatentable mental processes,233 but on appeal
the C.C.P.A. reversed, noting that because the claims did not include
implementation by the human mind, there was "no sound reason why the claims
in this case should be held to be non-statutory." 234 A unanimous Supreme Court
224. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Re-Examining the Role of Patents in Appropriating the Value
of DNA Sequences, 49 EMORY L.J. 783, 785-86 (2000); Merges & Nelson, supra note 69, at 851;
see also Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1,092, 1,093 (Jan. 5, 2001), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/sol/notices/utilexmguide.pdf.
225. See In re Benson, 441 F.2d 682, 688 (C.C.P.A. 1971); In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1393, 1406
(C.C.P.A. 1969).
226. Collins, supra note 211, at 355; Durham, supra note 41, at 818-20.
227. In re Abrams, 188 F.2d 165, 166 (C.C.P.A. 1951); accord Durham, supra note 211, at
964 (citing In re Abrams, 188 F.2d at 166).
228. The C.C.P.A. was the predecessor court to the Federal Circuit and was abolished by
Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982).
229. Prater, 415 F.2d at 1406; accord In re Musgrave, 431 F.2d 882, 892-93 (C.C.P.A. 1970)
(citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 788 (1876)).
230. Gruner, supra note 221, at 1036.
231. 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
232. Id. at 64.
233. In re Benson, 441 F.2d 682, 684 (1971).
234. Id. at 688.
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235
nonetheless held that the method was an unpatentable mathematical algorithm.
Although the Court agreed that the method had no substantial practical
application outside of a digital computer-and hence no real risk of patenting
human thought it was still just an unpatentable idea.236
Other cases have similarly held that algorithms or other alleged mental
processes are unpatentable subject matter, even when claimed only as used on a
237
computer or other device. These cases are based not on any risk of
involuntary infringement or of patenting actual human thought, but rather on the
a priori belief that knowledge itself is unpatentable even when stored on, or
implemented through, a machine. References to human thought or mental
processes are just metonymic allusions to what the courts see as the primarily
informational content of these claimed inventions.23 As the Federal Circuit
explained in Bancorp Services v. Sun Life Assurance Co., "the interchangeability
of certain mental processes and basic digital computation [] help explain why the
use of a computer in an otherwise patent ineligible process for no more than its
most basic function making calculations or computations-fails to circumvent
the prohibition against patenting abstract ideas and mental processes." 239
Perhaps the most cogent argument against patenting information and
knowledge is that it violates the traditional patent bargain under which patentees
receive exclusive rights over their inventions in exchange for dedicating any
related information to the public.240 In fact, many scholars argue that the patent
system's most important function is not so much its grant of short term,
individual rights over inventions, but the overall expansion of technological
knowledge it immediately releases into the public domain.24 The publication
and eventual expiration of patents thus reflects the larger notion that knowledge,
235. Benson, 409 U.S. at 71-72. Three of the Justices on the Court at the time took no part in
the decision. Id. at 73.
236. Id. at 71.
237. Bancorp Servs. v. Sun Life Assurance Co., 687 F.3d 1266, 1279 (Fed. Cir. 2012);
CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2011); In re Grams,
888 F.2d 835, 840-41 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (quoting In re Meyer, 688 F.2d 789, 794 (C.C.P.A. 1982));
In re Abele, 684 F.2d 902, 909 (C.C.P.A. 1982); In re Gelnovatch, 595 F.2d 32, 41 (C.C.P.A.
1979).
238. See, e.g., Benson, 409 U.S. at 67; CLS Bank Int'l v. Alice Corp. Pty., 717 F.3d 1269,
1286 (Fed. Cir. 2013); Bancorp Servs., 687 F.3d at 1279. Cf Collins, supra note 211, at 791 n.96
(citing In re Comiskey, 554 F.3d 967, 970 (Fed. Cir. 2009)) (describing this phenomenon as the
"rebirth" of the mental steps doctrine); Durham, supra note 211, at 969 (similar); Torrance, supra
note 211, at 34-35 (citing In re Comiskey, 554 F.3d at 970) (similar).
239. Bancorp Servs., 687 F.3d at 1278; accord Benson, 409 U.S. at 65.
240. See generally Collins, supra note 211 (arguing that patenting information violates the
quid pro quo underlying the patent system); see also Kevin Emerson Collins, Semiotics 101: Taking
the Printed Matter Doctrine Seriously, 85 IND. L.J. 1379, 1404 n.148 (2010) (arguing that
knowledge must remain free); Eisenberg, supra note 224, at 795 (discussing the patenting of DNA
sequence information).
241. Robert P. Merges, Commercial Success and Patent Standards: Economic Perspectives on
Innovation, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 803, 810 (1988).
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particularly scientific and technical knowledge, is not something that should be
privately owned.242
The patent document includes two basic sections: (1) the claims, which
describe the legal boundaries of the patentee's exclusive rights; and (2) the
specification, which discloses a wealth of further information, including how to
make and use the claimed invention, and the history of the invention and the
prior art on which it builds.243  This information is almost immediately made
available to the public; eighteen months after patent applications are filed, the
applications are published, regardless of whether any patent rights have or are
244likely to issue. Publication thus gives the public notice of what the applicants
hope to claim as their exclusive rights and discloses a great deal of detail about
the claimed invention, even before it is patented.245
There is some debate as an empirical matter whether patents in fact
discourage sharing of information, particularly among scientists doing basic
research, and whether anyone actually uses patents as a source of technological,
246
as opposed to legal, information. Nonetheless, patents at least in theory are
supposed to give the public immediate and free access to the information they
247
contain. Although the public may not use the disclosed information to make,
use, sell, or offer to sell the claimed invention itself,248 the public is free to use
this information for any other purpose, including improving upon or design
around the claimed invention or developing other inventions.249 This spillover
effect is part of the quid pro quo of the patent system, for it incentivizes
inventors to reveal what they might otherwise have kept as trade secrets. 250 If
242. See Stephen L. Carter, Does It Matter Whether Intellectual Property Is Property?, 68
CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 715, 718 (1993); see also Clarissa Long, Information Costs in Patent and
Copyright, 90 VA. L. REV. 465, 541-42 (2004) (citing Robert P. Merges, As Many As Six Impossible
Patents Before Breakfast: Property Rights for Business Concepts and Patent System Reform,
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577, 585 (1999)).
243. 35 U.S.C. §§ 111-12 (2012).
244. 35 U.S.C. § 122(b) (2012). Publication of the application does not occur if the patent
applicant has not also filed in other countries where patent applications are published eighteen
months after filing. Id.
245. Eisenberg, supra note 210, at 1028-29 (citations omitted).
246. See id. at 1029 (citing Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 533-34 (1966)); Eisenberg,
supra note 224, at 215; Lisa Larrimore Ouellete, Do Patents Disclose Useful Information?, 25
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 545, 555, 573 (2012); Rai, supra note 64, at 118.
247. See Collins, supra note 87, at 23-24 & n.44 (citing and quoting 3 DONALD D. CHISUM,
CHISUM ON PATENTS § 7.01, at 7-7 (Matthew Bender ed., 2014); Strandburg, supra note 189, at 91
(citing Eisenberg, supra note 210, at 1021).
248. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2012).
249. See Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 659 F.3d 1057, 1072-73 (Fed. Cir.
201 1);Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe, Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 981 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Slimfold Mfg.
Co. v. Kinkead Indus., Inc., 932 F.2d 1453, 1457 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
250. Classen Immunotherapies, Inc., 659 at 1072; see also Wagner, supra note 173, at 1009
(quoting Zvi Griliches, The Search for R&D Spillovers, 97 SCANDINAVIAN J. ECON. 29, 43-44
(1992); Richard C. Levin, Appropriability, R&D Spending, and Technological Performance, 78
AM. ECON. REV. 424, 425-26 (1988)) (discussing patent spillover effects).
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the claimed invention were itself information, however, the public likely would
not be able to use that information for any reason, as all "use" of the information
251
would be infringement under Section 154 of the Patent Act.
The patent bargain argument is in effect a repeat of the preemption argument
252
and can be criticized for the same reasons. If the freedom to use patent
disclosures is a concern, then presumably only claims to information by itself-
claims to pure information-should be unpatentable. Claims to physical
embodiments of information, such as natural phenomena, or claims that contain
any scope narrowing limitations at all, such as storage on a computer readable
medium or field of use restrictions, would not violate the patent bargain. For
example, patents on DNA do not violate the patent bargain; even though the
patents would preclude others from making or using the physical DNA
molecules themselves, others would still be free to use the genetic information
encoded in those DNA molecules as a public domain spillover.253
Indeed, very little of what is currently classified as unpatentable phenomena
of nature, laws of nature, or abstract ideas is purely just information in a way that
violates the patent bargain. The claims at issue in Mayo Collaborative Services
v. Prometheus Laboratories and Laboratory Corp. of America Holdings v.
Metabolite Laboratories, Inc. might seem to fall into the category of pure
information, as both claims comprised almost nothing other than information
that certain specified levels of chemicals in the body correlate with particular
254
medical states. Even the LabCorp and Prometheus claims contained
additional limitations, however. Others, therefore, still had free use of the
claimed correlations as long as they did not take the additional affirmative steps
of assaying homocysteine levels or administering thiopurines.2 55 The Supreme
Court Justices nonetheless felt that both claims were unacceptable attempts to
patent laws or phenomena of nature.256
That being said, one could argue, of course, that the suspect claims in
LabCorp and Prometheus, as well as Benson, had value only because of the
information they contained and that this information had no other value outside
257
of the claimed applications. Allowing patents on these claims would therefore
251. See Bitton, supra note 207, at 212; Collins, supra note 211, at 359 (citing Eisenberg,
supra note 210, at 794-95).
252. See supra Part III.A.
253. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Molecules v. Information: Should Patents Protect Both?, 8 B.U. J.
Sci. & TECH. L. 190, 197-99 (2002).
254. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1295 (2012) (claiming
blood thiopurine levels correlate with treatment efficacy); Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v.
Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 129 (2006) (claiming body homocysteine levels correlate with
cobalamin or folate deficiency).
255. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 132 S. Ct. at 1294; Lab. Corp. ofAm. Holdings, 548 U.S. at
130.
256. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 132 S. Ct. at 1294; Lab. Corp. ofAm. Holdings, 548 U.S. at
135.
257. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 63 (1972).
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effectively preempt all use of the claimed correlations, any additional limitations
notwithstanding. This more limited version of the preemption argument also
fails, however, as the same can be said of many claims to patentable uses of
information.
Compare, for example, the claims at issue in Diamond v. Diehr258 and
Parker v. Flook.259 Both cases involved claimed methods that distinguished
260themselves from the prior art by novel uses of mathematical algorithms. In
Diehr, the claimed invention was a more precise method for calculating rubber
curing times using the prior art Arrhenius equation. 26' Flook involved a more
precise method for calculating alarm limits during hydrocarbon catalysis using a
262
novel equation. Diehr's claim added a number of prior art steps, including
installing rubber in the curing press, closing the press, and constantly measuring
the temperature in the press.263 Flook's claimed process also included a number
of prior art steps, such as constantly measuring temperature, pressure, flow rates,
and adjusting alarm limits.264 One important difference between the two claimed
methods, however, is that Diehr's claimed mathematical algorithm had value
only for the claimed applications because the Arrhenius equation was developed
265
specifically for calculating rubber curing times. Flook's equation, on the other
hand, had been developed specifically for calculating alarm limits, but
266
apparently could be used outside of hydrocarbon catalysis. In terms of
relative preemptive scope then, Diehr's claim was arguably far more preemptive
than Flook's. To the degree that either claim threatened to violate the patent
bargain, surely Diehr posed more of a threat than did Flook.
258. 450 U.S. 175, 177-79 (1981).
259. 437 U.S. 584, 594 (1978).
260. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 177-79; Flook, 437 U.S. at 594; see also Mayo Collaborative Servs.,
at 1298-1300 (citing Diehr, 450 U.S. at 177-79, 187, 192 n.14; Flook, 437 U.S. at 585-87, 590,
594) (comparing Diehr and Flook).
261. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 177-79. It is somewhat difficult to tell from the Court's opinion what
the exact point of novelty was in Diehr's claimed method. The dissent clearly felt that the method's
novelty lay in its use of a digital computer to calculate rubber-curing times, id. at 206-09 (Stevens,
J., dissenting) while the majority seemed at one point to suggest that the method's novelty lay in its
continuous measurement of temperatures inside the curing press, id. at 178. The majority's opinion
did not depend on the novelty vel non of continuously measuring press temperatures, however, and
both the PTO and the C.C.P.A. seemed to view the method's novelty as lying solely in its use of the
Arrhenius equation to calculate cure times. Id. at 207-08.
262. Flook, 437 U.S. at 585-86, 594.
263. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 184. In this regard, the Court gave an arguably liberal interpretation to
claims 1 and 2 of Diehr's patent application, as neither of those claims directly stated a "physical
and chemical process" for curing rubber other than the operation of a rubber molding press. See id.
at 179. Nonetheless, the Court apparently viewed those claims as describing the entire rubber
molding process rather than just the calculation step of the process. Id. at 184.
264. Flook, 437 U.S. at 585; In re Flook, 559 F.2d 21, 22 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
265. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 177 n.2.
266. Flook, 437 U.S. at 586, 589-90.
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Nevertheless, the Supreme Court found Diehr's claim to be a patentable
267
process, but found Flook's claim to be an unpatentable mathematical formula.
Althoulh the Court in each case seemed to focus on the relative scope of the
claims, 8 what ultimately proved dispositive in each case seems to have little to
do with the patent bargain or preempting use of information. As the Court
explained in both decisions, "a process is not unpatentable simply because it
contains a law of nature or a mathematical algorithm." 269 Instead, the Court
seemed much more intent on the nature of the additional steps in each case,
finding that Diehr's invention as a whole constituted an application of a law of
nature, but that Flook's invention, even when considered as a whole,
"contain[ed] no patentable invention." 270 Similarly, the Benson Court based its
rejection on the concern that the computerized method at issue there would cover
both known and unknown "end uses" of the algorithm.271 The Court never
defined what it meant by end use, instead suggesting that transformation and
reduction of an article to a different state or thing might be an end use, but then
denying that such transformation was necessary for patentability.272 Once again,
the Court explains that a claimed invention must constitute an "end use,"
"inventive application," or "inventive concept" to be patentable subject matter
were seen,273 but the Court once again provided no definition of what those
terms mean other than "we know it when we see it." 274
A final possible rationale for excluding information and knowledge as
unpatentable subject matter is the need to distinguish patent from other forms of
275intellectual property. Copyright, trademark, and trade secrecy are all designed
to achieve different goals than those of patent law, and each type of protection
has a different term of duration, rights of exclusivity, analyses for infringement,
276
and requirements for eligibility, including subject matter restrictions. A lack
of clear distinctions between the types of subject matter protected under each
intellectual property regime could lead to a number of problems, including
administrative costs and increased search and examination costs, as well as a
lack of uniformity, reducing the value of intellectual property protections
267. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 192-93; Flook, 437 U.S. at 594.
268. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187; Flook, 437 U.S. at 586.
269. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187 (quoting Flook, 437 U.S. at 590).
270. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187; Flook, 437 U.S. at 594.
271. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 68 (1972).
272. Id. at 68, 70-71.
273. See supra text accompanying notes 144-49.
274. Collins, Bilski, supra note 6, at 39.
275. See generally Michael J. Madison, Beyond Invention: Patent as Knowledge Law, 15
LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 71 (2011) (tracing historical distinctions between patentable and
copyrightable subject matter).
276. Patent law is generally characterized as having more stringent qualification requirements
and a shorter term of protection but stronger rights once protection is granted. Copyright and
trademark law, by contrast, offer much "thinner" rights of exclusivity but for longer periods with
less stringent qualification criteria. Karjala, supra note 11, at 462; Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Lotus v.
Borland: Copyright and Computer Programs, 70 TUL. L. REV. 2397, 2420 n.70 (1996).
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generally.277 Perhaps information, knowledge, and expression are protected
under the patent system because they may be otherwise protectable under
copyright, trademark, or trade secrecy.
Take for example the differences between copyrightable and patentable
subject matter. Copyright law stems from the same clause of the Constitution as
patent law, but rather than granting to inventors the exclusive right to their
discoveries "[t]o promote the progress of useful arts, [copyright law grants]
'Authors' the exclusive right to their 'Writings' to promote the progress of
'Science."' 278  Science refers not to what modem language would call science,
but to knowledge, learning, art, and the liberal arts more generally.279 Allowing
patents on information, knowledge, expression, or other abstract ideas might
therefore violate the constitutional division between the copyright and patent
systems.280
That being said, much of what falls outside of patentable subject matter
boundaries also falls well outside of the boundaries of copyright and trademark
protection.21 The gap between these types of protections is so large that it
encompasses a good deal of valuable subject matter that can be protected only
282through trade secrecy, if at all. Functional ideas and principles such as
mathematical algorithms and laws of nature are neither patentable nor
277. See TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 29, 34-35 (2001); see
also Chiang, supra note 58, at 1234-35 (citing Dennis D. Crouch, The Patent Lottery: Exploiting
Behavioral Economics For the Common Good, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 141, 150 (2008); Mark A.
Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1495, 1497 (2001)) (discussing
the general cost/benefit ratio of the patent system); Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 48 (citing Brian
Kahin, Patents and Diversity in Innovation, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 389 (2007))
(discussing differences in cost regarding patent reform); see generally Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Patent
Law, the Federal Circuit, and the Supreme Court: A Quiet Revolution, 11 S. CT. ECON. REV. 1
(2004) (arguing that relaxing patentability standards effectively will require lowering patent
strength).
278. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
279. See In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (Archer, J., dissenting) (citing
CHISUM, supra note 33, §1.01, at 1-8 n.14); see generally Coulter, supra note 8 (distinguishing
science from the useful arts); Lutz, supra note 19 (same); Walterscheid, supra note 19 (same).
280. See, e.g., Karjala, supra note 11, at 448-52 (citations omitted) (discussing distinctions
between patentable and copyrightable subject matter); see also Collins, supra note 87, at 13
(discussing "information qua information).
281. Karjala, supra note 11, at 471-72 (citing Wendy J. Gordon, On Owning Information:
Intellectual Property and the Restitutionary Impulse, 78 VA. L. REV. 149, 277 (1992); Richard H.
Stern, Scope of Protection Problems With Patents and Copyrights on Methods of Doing Business,
10 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 105, 153 (1999)).
282. Trade secrecy can be used to protect anything that would otherwise qualify as patentable
subject matter, as well as a great deal of subject matter that would not, such as computer software.
David W. Carstens, Legal Protection of Computer Software: Patents, Copyrights, and Trade
Secrets, 20 J. CONTEMP. L. 13, 65 (1994). As such, trade secrecy is typically seen as an alternative
to patent protection, rather than a completely disparate form of protection. Shubha Ghosh, Patents
and the Regulatory State: Rethinking the Patent Bargain Metaphor After Eldred, 19 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1315, 1337 (2004) (citing Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicorn Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 474-84
(1974).
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copyrightable, and even expressive concepts such as scenes i faire and artistic
283
genres cannot be protected under either system. In other words, much of what
copyright law considers unprotectably functional is nonetheless not functional or
useful enough to be protectable under patent law.284
Much the same analysis applies to trademark law as well. Trademark law is
designed to reduce consumer search costs by protecting words, names, symbols,
285
and devices that distinguish goods and services and identify their source.
Trademark law's core purpose is thus to improve the quality of information in
the marketplace.286 Trademark law thus does allow protection of, and in point of
fact is designed to protect source-identifying information, but other types of
descriptions and information are not protectable as trademarks.287
Specifically, trademark law prohibits protection of functional subject matter,
but like copyright law defines functionality very differently from the way that
288patent law defines it in many cases. On the one hand, trademark's
functionality doctrine serves to prevent the use of trade dress protection to
acquire exclusivity of potentially unlimited duration over previously patented
inventions.289 "The Lanham Act does not exist to reward manufacturers for their
innovation in creating a particular device; that is the purpose of the patent law
and its period of exclusivity. "290 Trademark's functionality doctrine goes far
beyond simply excluding patentable functional devices, however. Functionality
under trademark law also bars protection of any feature that is merely "essential
to the use or purpose of the article or if it affects the cost or quality of the
article[,] ... the exclusive use of [which] would put competitors at a significant
non-reputation-related disadvantage."2 9' Courts have accordingly barred
trademark protection for colors, clothing designs, and even certain words if they
are considered necessary for competitors to describe their own goods and
services or to compete as to cost and quality.292 None of these would ever be
283. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012) ("In no case does copyright protection for an original work of
authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle,
or discovery. . . ."); see also Stern, supra note 281, at 153 (noting examples of uncopyrightable
subject matter).
284. Karjala, supra note 11, at 448-51 (citations omitted).
285. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012).
286. Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 NOTRE DAME L.
REv. 1839, 1840 (2007).
287. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e) (2012); see generally Mary LaFrance, Initial Impressions:
Trademark Protection for Abbreviations of Generic or Descriptive Terms, 45 AKRON L. REv. 201,
239 (2012) (discussing trademarkable subject matter).
288. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 17 cmt. a (1995).
289. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 775 (1992).
290. TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 34 (2001).
291. Id. at 32 (quoting Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 165 (1995))
(emphasis added).
292. Id. at 33 (citing Qualitex Co., 514 U.S. at 165; Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives
Laboratories, Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 850 n.10 (1982)); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR
COMPETITION §§ 14, 15, 17 (1995) (discussing functionality); Mark P. McKenna,
(Dys)Functionality, 48 Hous. L. REV. 823, 848-49 (2011) (citations omitted).
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considered patentable subject matter, nor are they protectable as trademarks.293
If avoiding overlap with other intellectual property regimes were the goal of
patentable subject matter restrictions, then patent protection could be much
broader and more encompassing than it is.
On the other hand, as the bounds of protectable subject matter under each
area of intellectual property has expanded, the lines between each have begun to
blur, particularly with the advent of computer software and the Information
294Age. For most of history, the distinctions between each form of intellectual
295
property were relatively simple. Patents protected only functional creations,
while copyright and trademark protected purely nonfunctional expression and
source-identifying marks, respectively. 296 Computer software spans the divide
between copyright and patent and is often eligible for protection under both
regimes, particularly where the line is fuzzy as between the expressive and
functional elements of the software.297  Even the line between trademark and
patent has blurred somewhat due to increasing efforts to use potentially
patentable product configurations as source identifiers.298  Thus, if avoiding
overlap with other intellectual property regimes were a goal of the patent system,
the system has not been particularly successful.
Why information, whether in the form of laws of nature, abstract ideas, or
even phenomena of nature, is unpatentable subject matter is unclear. Scientific
and technological information and knowledge obviously can serve to promote
technological progress, and yet the patent system staunchly refuses to allow
patents on information299 even though such patents would not preempt future
invention or research, would pose no risk of involuntary infringement, or
threaten to violate the patent bargain. Whether or not information itself should
be patentable is not a question to be answered here, however. The main point is
293. See generally McKenna, supra note 286 (discussing the functionality doctrine in
trademark).
294. Bitton, supra note 207, at 157-58; see Karjala, supra note 11, at 442; Madison, supra
note 275, at 100-04 (citations omitted).
295. Karjala, supra note 11, at 440-41 (citations omitted).
296. Id. at 442, 449; Lunney, supra note 276, at 2398 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8);
see also Lloyd L. Weinreb, Copyright for Functional Expression, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1149, 1152
(1998). Functionality under copyright law means "as a practical matter[,] indispensable, or at least
standard, in the treatment of' the work's ideas. Lunney, supra note 276, at 2402 (quoting Atari, Inc.
v. N. Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp. 672 F.2d 607, 616 (7th Cir. 1982); accord Pamela
Samuelson, Questioning Copyrights in Standards, 48 B.C.L. REV. 193, 217-18 (2007)
297. Burk, supra note 99, at 100-01; 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT, § 2.19, at 2-211 (2014).
298. Timothy R. Holbrook, Patents, Presumptions, and Public Notice, 86 IND. L.J. 779, 813-
15 (2011) (quoting TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 29-30 (2001)) (citing
Walmart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 212-13 (2000)); Madison, supra note
249, at 100 (citing Walmart Stores, Inc., 529 U.S. at 207, 212-14).
299. See Eisenberg, supra note 210, at 196.
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that information seems to be unpatentable subject matter for no other reason than
that it is just not what the patent system views as patentable technology.3 00
C. The "Discovery" Versus "Invention" Rationale
One final rationale for patentable subject matter restrictions often cited by
the courts is the distinction between inventions from discoveries.301 An
invention is a human-made phenomenon and "the product of human
ingenuity,"302 while discoveries are the products of natural forces and exist and
act 'independently of any effort of the patentee."' 303  Only inventions are
patentable subject matter; 304 discoveries are "of course" unpatentable. 305
Accordingly, as the Supreme Court explained in Diamond v. Chakrabarty, the
relevant distinction for purposes of section 101 is "between products of
nature ... and human-made inventions."306  Human involvement also helps
explain what the courts mean when they refer to inventive concepts or
"applications." Phenomena of nature and laws of nature are not inventive
concepts or applications, and therefore are not patentable subject matter because
they are merely discovered, not created through human effort.307
At first glance, this distinction between discoveries and inventions seems to
make sense on both a constitutional and a practical level. If the Constitution
restricts patent protections to only the "useful Arts," human invention may be a
constitutional requirement, for the term "Art" is defined as the exercise of human
skill, as distinguished from nature.308 Further, if the patent system is designed to
incentivize progress in useful Arts, logically that incentive can have effect only
by influencing human inventive activities, not naturally occurring phenomena
and laws.
Closer inspection suggests an alternative view. Many laws and phenomena
of nature require significant investments of human ingenuity to identify and
300. See id.; Gruner, supra note 221, at 1031-32.
301. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 593
(1978); Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U. S. 127, 131-32 (1948) (citing Cuno
Eng'g Corp v. Automatic Devices Corp., 314 U.S. 84, 90-91 (1941)); CLS Bank Int'l v. Alice
Corp. Pty., 717 F.3d 1269, 1283 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (quoting Flook, 437 U.S. at 593 n.15).
302. Charkrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309.
303. Id. at 310 (quoting FunkBros. Seed Co., 333 U.S. at 131).
304. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293 (2012); Bilski v.
Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3230 (2010) (citing Flook, 437 U.S. at 589-90).
305. Funk Bros. Seed Co., 333 U.S. at 130 (emphasis added); accord Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at
309; see generally Sarnoff, supra note 64 (analyzing the history behind the distinction between
"discoveries" and "inventions").
306. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 313.
307. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 132 S. Ct. at 1294; Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309; Flook, 437
U.S. at 594; CLS Bank Int'l v. Alice Corp. Pty., 717 F.3d 1269, 1283 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (quoting
Flook, 437 U.S. at 593 n.15).
308. Definition of Art, DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/art (last
visited August 27, 2014).
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discover.309 As Justice Breyer observed in his dissenting opinion in Laboratory
Corp. Holdings v. Metabolite Laboratories, Inc.:
The justification for [excluding discoveries] does not lie in any claim
that 'laws of nature' are obvious, or that their discovery is easy, or that
they are not useful. To the contrary, research into such matters may be
costly and time consuming; monetary incentives may matter; and the
fruits of those incentives and that research may prove of great benefit to
310the human race.
And given that discoveries can be quite valuable in promoting technological
progress, patenting discoveries arguably comports with the Constitution's
mandate that the patent system promotes progress in useful arts. 31' Nor is it
clear that the Constitution requires that the patent system cover only inventions
and not discoveries. The Constitution states that Congress may grant inventors
exclusive rights in their "Discoveries,,312 and along the same lines, section 101
of the Patent Act states that "whoever invents or discovers [a] new and useful
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter" may be granted a
313patent. Textually speaking then, the law could be read to allow patents on
both inventions and discoveries. The patent system has never interpreted either
the Constitution or section 101 this way, however.
The preemption argument is the most common justification given for
excluding discoveries, but other justifications exist as well. One possible
rationale for reading section 101 as disallowing patents on discoveries is that
discoveries neither warrant nor benefit from patenting.3 14 Discoveries of laws or
phenomena of nature are often the result of pure or basic research, as opposed to
applied research. 315  Basic research is often characterized as the pursuit of
upstream knowledge that itself has no commercial value until developed further
316into downstream applications. Those who pursue basic research therefore are
sometimes thought to do so purely for the sake of knowledge, not market based
309. See Bitton, supra note 207, at 208-09.
310. 548 U.S. 124, 126 (2006) (Breyer, J. dissenting); accord Durham, supra note 211, at
953-54 (citing Dickey-John Corp. v. Int'l Tapetronics Corp., 710 F.2d 329, 348 n.9 (7th Cir.
1983)).
311. See generally Yu, supra note 59, at 394 (arguing that patentable subject matter
restrictions should focus more on what promotes innovation rather than on false distinctions
between "discoveries" and "inventions").
312. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
313. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
314. See Alan Devlin & Neel Sukhatme, Self-Realizing Inventions and the Utilitarian
Foundation ofPatent Law, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 897, 904 (2009).
315. See id.
316. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 158, at 306; Rebecca S. Eisenberg & Robert P.
Merges, Opinion Letter as to the Patentability of Certain Questions Associated with the
Identification ofPartial cDNA Sequences, 23 AIPLA Q.J. 1, 19-20 (1995); Rai, supra note 64, at,
133-34.
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317gain. To the extent scientists exact returns from their basic research, they are
thought to do so in the noncommercial form of publication, promotion, and
respect.318 Moreover, because its market value is often uncertain and remote,
basic research is commonly funded through government and private grants ex
ante, not ex post through patent licensing or royalties.3 19 Because the patent
system is designed to incentivize investments in research and development,
discoveries already incentivized by other means and funded through government
grants presumably should not be patentable. 320 The incentive effect of a patent
for such discoveries would be attenuated at best, and probably redundant.32 '
This line of reasoning oversimplifies things a bit, however. While many
discoveries may result from government funded basic research, others result
from privately funded investments in marketable applications.322 The line
between applied research and basic research has blurred as industries and
universities have come to realize the value of research as itself a form of
323business. Many discoveries about nature can be commercially exploited
almost immediately; correlations regarding metabolite and vitamin blood levels,
genes that predict heightened cancer risks, and bacterial crop inoculants were all
considered phenomena or laws of nature, but all had immediate market value.324
Patents on these discoveries could therefore have been quite valuable and
provided a strong incentive for investing in the basic research necessary to make
these discoveries. As a policy matter then, the patent system's incentive effect
might be more useful for some types of unpatentable discoveries than it is for
325
many types of patentable inventions.
Debates over the necessity or efficiency of patent incentives are not limited
to discoveries of natural laws and phenomena, furthermore. Similar arguments
have been made that abstract ideas such as business methods and some computer
software do not need patent incentives because their research and development
costs are low, or because first mover advantages, network effects, and other non-
317. Devlin & Sukhatme, supra note 314, at 925-26.
318. Id.; see Durham, supra note 211, at 953.
319. See generally Brett M. Frischmann, Innovation and Institutions: Rethinking the
Economics of U.S. Science and Technology Policy, 24 VT. L. REV. 347, 376-79 (2000) (quoting
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8) (discussing market failures in funding basic research).
320. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 158, at 306.
321. See Devlin & Sukhatme, supra note 314, at 925-27.
322. Bitton, supra note 207, at 203 (citing LANDES & POSNER, supra note 158, at 306-07);
Eisenberg, supra note 224, at 10 17-18)
323. Eisenberg, supra note 210, at 1017-18; Laura Pedraza-Farina, Patent and the Sociology
of Innovation, 2013 Wis. L. REV. 813, 855 (quoting and citing STEVEN SHAPN, THE SCIENTIFIC
LIFE: A MORAL HISTORY OF A LATE MODERN VOCATION 2-3, 18-19, 97-98 (2008)).
324. See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1295-96 (2012);
Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 128 (2006) (per curiam)
(Breyer, J., dissenting); Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U. S. 127, 130 (1948).
325. Durham, supra note 211, at 953-54 (citing Dickey-John Corp. v. Int'l Tapetronics Corp.,
710 F.2d 329, 348 n.9 (7th Cir. 1983)); Sarnoff, supra note 64, at 57-58.
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patent incentives and advantages are more than adequate.326 Focusing on
whether patents are needed to incentivize discoveries glosses over the fact that
whether the patent system truly provides any incentives at all, even for
inventions clearly within the strictures of patentable subject matter, is a matter
327
still up for debate. No one knows if patents, in fact, can incentivize basic
research and discovery and, if so, whether those incentives would be efficient.3 28
Using the patent system to channel inventive resources into innovative business
methods could very well be more efficient than channeling them solely toward
other subject matter that is considered more technological.3 The indeterminacy
of these questions is perhaps why patentability has never specifically relied on
questions of how much research and development investment went into the
claimed invention or what kind of returns that investment could earn outside of
the patent system.330 Patentable subject matter is not a question of incentives,
and courts have even said as much.33 '
Another possible explanation for patent law's distinction between
discoveries and inventions is more subtle and only hinted at in the case law. In
referring to unpatentable subject matter, the courts sometimes use language that
suggests that allowing patents on laws and phenomena of nature, and even
abstract ideas, violates fundamental moral or ethical beliefs in some way.
Discoveries are "manifestations of. . .nature, free to all men and reserved
exclusively to none. He who discovers a hitherto unknown phenomenon of
nature has no claim to a monopoly of it which the law recognizes."332
Moreover, discomfort with the ethical implications of patenting certain types
of subject matter extends to many things that are clearly human-made and not
326. See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Are Business Method Patents Bad for Business?, 16
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 263, 274-76 (2000) (arguing business methods do
not need patent incentives); Samuelson, supra note 213, at 1142-43 (discussing software
innovation).
327. See Chiang, supra note 58, at 1239 (citing Louis Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust
Intersection: A Reappraisal, 97 HARV. L. REv. 1813, 1844 (1984)); Duffy, supra note 5, at 619-20;
Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 45. But see Olson, supra note 10 (arguing that one can set patentable
subject matter restrictions to include only innovations that would not have arisen without patent
incentives).
328. Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 49.
329. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 158, at 23 n.19.
330. Devlin & Sukhatme, supra note 314, at 902 (citing Michael A. Carrier, Cabining
Intellectual Property Through a Property Paradigm, 54 DUKE L.J. 1, 32, 33 & n.123 (2004);
Ramsey Hanna, Note, Misusing Antitrust: The Search for Functional Copyright Misuse Standards,
46 STAN. L. REv. 401, 425-26 (1994)); Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 49.
331. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1305 (2012); Lab.
Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 127-28 (2006) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948)); see
also Erica L. Anderson, Note, Finding a 'Fit:" Gene Patents and Innovation Policy, 4 HASTINGS
SCI. & TECH. L.J. 357, 374-77 (2012) (citations omitted) (noting Supreme Court's reluctance to
fine-tailor patentable subject matter based on incentives).
332. Funk Bros. Seed Co., 333 U.S. at 130; accord Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303,
309 (1980); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)
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discoveries. Not all unpatentable subject matter is a law or phenomena of
nature, of course. Legal and economic theories, data, music and literature, and
even human activity itself in the form of mental activity, human behavior, and
interpersonal interactions and relationships are unpatentable as abstract ideas
even though they are clearly the product of human intervention.333 Like the
prohibition on patenting discoveries, the prohibition against patenting abstract
ideas is nevertheless often phrased in deontological terms.334  Abstract ideas
have also been described as "part of the storehouse of knowledge of all
men . . . free to all men and reserved exclusively to none." 335 "In other words,
the patent statute does not allow patents on particular systems that depend for
their operation on human intelligence alone, a field of endeavor that both the
framers and Congress intended to be beyond the reach of patentable subject
matter." 336
Perhaps, then, the categories of excluded subject matter are founded not so
337
much on economic or pragmatic concerns, but on moral and ethical ones.
References to social mores appear in various places in patent law. Natural laws
and phenomena have been described as the products of divine rather than human
intervention. "After all, God or Allah or Jahveh or Vishnu or the Great Spirit
provided these laws and phenomena as humanity's common heritage."338
Socially valuable human activities such as medical and surgical procedures enjoy
some exemptions from patent infringement liability for what seem to be purely
ethical rather than practical reasons.339 Several commentators have protested
that sports method patents are contrary to the ethos of competition based on
personal skill, not patented technique. 340  Most recently, the Leahy-Smith
333. See Interim Guidance, supra note 216, at 43,296; Chisum, supra note 33, at 980-84
(quoting Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)); Richard S. Gruner, Intangible Inventions:
Patentable Subject Matter for an Information Age, 35 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 355, 373 (2002) (quoting
John R. Thomas, The Post-Industrial Patent System, 10 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT.
L.J. 3, 34-35 (1999)).
334. See generally Sarnoff, supra note 64, at 84-90 (citations omitted) (discussing religious
origins of prohibiting patents).
335. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3225 (quoting Funk Bros. Seed Co., 333 U.S. at 130).
336. In re Comiskey, 554 F.3d 967, 980 (Fed. Cir. 2009); accord Benson, 409 U.S. at 67.
337. See generally Linda J. Demain & Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Reinventing the Double Helix:
A Novel and Nonobvious Reconceptualization of the Biotechnology Patent, 55 STAN. L. REV. 303,
434-35 (2002) (citations omitted) (discussing human rights and dignity implications of gene
patenting); Sarnoff, supra note 64, at 84-90 (similar).
338. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 1013 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc) (Rader, J., dissenting); accord
Sarnoff, supra note 64, at 85 (quoting and citing JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATIES OF GOVERNMENT
§ 26, at 328 (1689)).
339. Cynthia M. Ho, Patents, Patients, and Public Policy: An Incomplete Intersection at 35
U.S.C. § 287(c), 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 601, 634-45 (2000) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 287(c)-(1)
(2012)); Sarnoff, supra note 64, at 110.
340. See Neeraj Arora, Disabling Patentability for Skill-Based Inventions: Aligning Patent
Law with Competition Policy, 22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 1, 38 (2005) (citing
U.S. Patent No. 5,616,089 (filed Mar. 29, 1996); U.S. Patent No. 6,712,720 (filed Mar. 11, 2002));
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America Invents Act amended section 101 to ban "a claim directed to or
encompassing a human organism" to codify long-standing objections to patents
on human beings.34 '
These morality and ethics based objections are more the exception to the
rule than the rule, however, as the U.S. patent system has remained mostly
342
agnostic about morality and ethics. Unlike the European patent system, the
U.S. patent system has no prohibitions against patenting inventions that
contravene morality or public order.3 43  Although the categories of exclusion
may have originally had some basis in deontological concerns, morals change
over time, as does technology.3 44  Subject matter categories based on those
morals would likely have changed over time as well. Over the decades, the
courts have been presented with ethics based calls to ban patents on living
organisms, genetic material, and other inventions, but then they have been
reluctant to do so and have declined to add more categories of exclusions,345
recognizing that morality and other social policies are best left for areas of law
better suited to the task.3 46
Derek Bambaurer, Legal Responses to the Challenges of Sports Patents, 18 HARV. J. LAW & TECH.
401, 423-24 (2005); Kukkonen, supra note 148, at 823-24.
341. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 33(a), 125 Stat. 284, 340-41
(2011); see also Memorandum from Robert Bahr, Senior Patent Counsel, U.S. Pat. & Trademark
Off., for Patent Examining Corps. (Sept. 20, 2011) (on file with U.S. Pat. and Trademark Off.)
(discussing patent claims encompassing human beings); MPEP, supra note 182, § 2105, at 2123
(discussing patent claims encompassing human beings); Donald J. Quigg, Animals - Patentability,
1077 OFF. GAZ. PAT. OFF. 24 (Apr. 21, 1987), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/patents/patog/week53/OG/TOCCN/item-137.htm#clil37 (discussing
patent claims encompassing human beings and organic life forms).
342. See generally Bagley, supra note 215, at 474-75 (discussing the lack of morality-based
limits on patentable subject matter).
343. Yvonne Cripps, The Art and Science of Genetic Modification: Re-Engineering Patent
Law and Constitutional Orthodoxies, 11 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 1, 20-21 (2004).
344. Robert P. Merges, Intellectual Property in Higher Life Forms: The Patent System and
Controversial Technologies, 47 MD. L. REV. 1051, 1064-65 (1988) (citations omitted).
345. See, e.g., Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct 2107, 2120
(2013) (declining to declare all genetic material unpatentable); Bilski v. Kapos, 130 S. Ct. 3218,
3229 (2010) (refusing to hold all business methods unpatentable); Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447
U.S. 303, 310-17 (1980) (citations omitted) (declining to categorize all living organisms as
unpatentable subject matter); AT&T Corp. v. Excel Comm. Mktg., Inc., 172 F.3d 1352, 1360 (Fed.
Cir. 1999) (declining to declare all computer-based programming unpatentable); see also State
Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Sig. Fin. Grp., Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1376 n.13 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (noting
the difficulty of distinguishing business methods from "means of carrying it out"); Eisenberg, supra
note 6, at 19-20 (citing Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3229 (2010); Prometheus Labs. v. Mayo
Collaborative Servs., 628 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2010), rev'd, 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012); Ass'n for
Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off., 653 F.3d 1329, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2011), vacated,
33 S. Ct. 2107 (2013)).
346. See, e.g., Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 317-18 & n.Il (citing 41 Fed. Reg. 27,902 (July 7,
1976); 43 Fed. Reg. 60,080, 60,108, 60,134 (Dec. 22, 1978)); Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang,
Inc., 185 F.3d 1364, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Quigg, 932 F.2d 920, 923
(Fed. Cir. 1991).
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IV. THE INEVITABILITY OF INTUITION IN DETERMINING PATENTABLE SUBJECT
MATTER
The courts have cited a number of rationales for why certain claimed
inventions are patentable subject matter and others are not. As the previous
section demonstrates, none of these rationales actually explains why patentable
subject matter law is the way it is. The courts clearly have definite ideas about
what qualifies as patentable subject matter, however. So what does drive
patentable subject matter law?
All patentable subject matter determinations are based on intuition-
specifically, our intuitive understanding of what patentable technology and the
useful arts are. Although alarming for its lack of predictability and lack of
rigorous deductive reasoning, 347 the intuitive nature of patentable subject matter
is unavoidable-and perhaps even desirable-in light of the fact that there is
simply no other more rigorous and yet durable way of identifying the proper
boundaries for patentable subject matter.
Before discussing the implications of intuitionism in patentable subject
matter, however, it would be useful first to clarify what it means to say that
patentable subject matter is based on intuition. Intuitionism in the law can
manifest itself in a variety of forms for a variety of reasons.3 48  The concept of
intuitionism as used here refers specifically to the fact that patentable subject
matter defies any sort of a clear and predictive definition through objective
yardsticks, be they statutory categories, bright-line rules and tests, or even
judicial precedent.3 49  This is because the primarily economic rationales
supposedly driving the patent system do not-and as explained in more detail
below cannot define what should or should not constitute patentable subject
matter. This distinctive inability to rely on economic rationales thus often leaves
us with patentable subject matter decisions that seem to be unarticulated and
even unexplained. Indeed, it is exactly this inability to articulate or explain
one's rationale that is the most generally understood meaning of intuitionism.350
The heavy reliance on intuitionism in patentable subject matter stems from
two characteristics fundamental to the patent system. One, the patent must
accommodate not only new developments, but also developments across an
incredibly broad spectrum of technologies.351 Patents are a one-size-fits-all
system, and the vast and growing array of sciences and technologies that the
patent system covers are all subject to the same patentability requirements and
347. Wright, supra note 10, at 1382-83 (quoting Paul Gewirtz, On "I Know It When ISee It ",
105 YALE L.J. 1023, 1024 (1996)); Mark C. Modak-Truran, A Pragmatic Justification of the
Judicial Hunch, 35 U. RICH. L. REV. 55,58 (2001).
348. See generally Wright, supra note 10, at 1385, 1398 (discussing the many forms
intuitionism can take in legal decision-making).
349. Morris, supra note 41, at 505, 517.
350. See Wright, supra note 10, at 1389.
351. Morris, supra note 41, at 505.
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352protected under the same twenty-year term. The patent system is also
designed to incentivize the creation of novel and unique developments within
these technologies.353 The ever-changing array of subject matter that results,
especially given the wide range of technologies swept under the patent banner,
defies neat categorization or evaluation through bright-line rules or tests. 354 The
patent system is consequently one of the most difficult areas of law in which to
achieve clarity and predictability.355
The constant novelty of technological developments also limits the courts'
ability to analogize from established precedent, which is itself an exercise in
356intuition. When dealing with unique new technologies, how does one choose
the most closely related and therefore relevant precedent? The less analogous the
precedent or relevant the doctrine, the more a court is left to its own devices and
* * *357its intuitions in making its decision.
The second fundamental characteristic that forces reliance on intuition is the
fact that patentable subject matter defies definition even by the less formalistic
358
means of weighing and balancing rationales and policies. When analogy to
precedent, linguistic formulas, and statutory language do not dictate a particular
outcome, courts often resort to underlying policies as first principles.359 In the
case of patentable subject matter, however, these primarily economic underlying
policies are of no help. Legal decision-making based on a balance of factors
such as these require some level of intuition,360 but in the case of the patent
system, the direction to which these factors point is simply indeterminate,
361
making intuition all the more important.
The purpose of the patent system is to promote progress in useful arts, but
this does not and in fact cannot tell us what patentable subject matter boundaries
should or should not be. The question of whether patenting any particular
claimed invention might promote or might instead hinder technological progress
is unfalsifiable. How to identify patentable subject matter in a way that best
incentivizes technological progress without unduly hindering future innovation is
352. See Duffy, supra note 5, at 614 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2006)).
353. Morris, supra note 41, at 505.
354. Id.
355. See Duffy, supra note 5, at 616-17.
356. See Wright, supra note 10, at 1417-18 (quoting Case R. Sunstein, Commentary, On
Analogical Reasoning, 106 HARV. L. REV., 741, 741-42 (1993); ALAN GOLDMAN, MORAL
KNOWLEDGE 188 (1988)).
357. See id. at 1418.
358. Morris, supra note 41, at 505.
359. Larry Alexander, The Banality of Legal Reasoning, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 517, 518-
19 (1998); Modak-Truran, supra note 347, at 63, 65-66 (quoting Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr., The
Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the "Hunch" in Judicial Decisions, 14 CORNELL L. REv. 274,
276 (1928-29)).
360. Wright, supra note 8, at 1398.
361. Duffy, supra note 5, at 619-20.
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362perhaps impossible to determine without prescience. Again, all patents have
the potential to hinder further research and development, and how best to
incentivize any given type of technological development is far from clear.363
Unfortunately, what effect, if any, the patent system has at all is questionable.364
How much any given subject matter might hinder or facilitate future research is
therefore difficult, if not impossible, to predict.3 65
It therefore comes as no surprise that, despite the courts' constant references
to preemption, disproportionality, certainty, and the other economic rationales
underlying the patent system, the courts never actually apply these rationales in
making patentable subject matter determinations. There is good reason to doubt
whether the patent system could ever translate its economic rationales into
effective patentable subject matter standards, however. Indeed, the
indeterminacy of patent's underlying rationales is the primary reason that
patentable subject matter is inevitably based on intuition.
Because of the patent system's unique features, every patent application
effectively presents a case of first impression, leaving courts to figure out into
which categories-included subject matter or excluded subject matter-each
new invention.3 66 These facts affect not only in how section 101 is drafted, but
also in how it has been interpreted via rules and doctrines, precedent, and policy
based derivative rationales, and how poorly those interpretations have fared.
It is not surprising, for example, that the categories of excluded and included
subject matter are as vague as they are, for their vagueness provides the
flexibility necessary to adjust future technological developments.3 67
Nonetheless, the very ambiguity that allows such flexibility also begs some
obvious questions. What do the four section 101 categories of included subject
matter even mean? And on what basis were they established as included subject
matter? Again, there is no reason to believe that patents on only processes,
machines, manufactures, and compositions of matter promote progress in useful
arts. Likewise, characterizations of abstract ideas, laws of nature, algorithms, or
even phenomena of nature are so broad that they could cover a wide variety of
362. Duffy, supra note 5, at 618 (quoting Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs.,
Inc., 584 U.S. 124, 128 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting)). Many others have written extensively about
what patentable subject matter doctrine should be, and this Article does not try to retread that
ground. See, e.g., Chin, supra note 52 (criticizing "marketplace" definitions of patentable subject
matter); Gruner, supra note 333 (discussing how patentable subject matter boundaries should be
redrawn to accommodate intangible inventions); Lemley et al., supra note 88 (advocating an
abstract idea test that focuses on claim breadth); Olson, supra note 10 (similar); Samuelson, supra
note 213 (arguing against patents on computer program innovations manipulating information).
363. Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 49 (citing Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 315-16
(1980)); Sarnoff, supra note 64, at 56.
364. Chiang, supra note 58, at 1239 (citing Kaplow, supra note 347, at 1844); Duffy, supra
note 5, at 619-20; Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 45; Olson, supra note 12, at 194.
365. See Merges & Nelson, supra note 69, at 848.
366. Duffy, supra note 5, at 639.
367. Id. at 611, 620.
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subject matter, both patentable and unpatentable, as well as the wide variety of
rationales for distinguishing between the two.368
The courts have sought not only to fill this void but also to give it a bright-
line, predictive structure by implementing a multitude of judicial doctrines and
tests.369 The patent system seems to have articulated so many judicial doctrines
and tests over the years that it seems to have a different rule or doctrine for every
circumstance. Given the ever-changing landscape of technological development,
however, these judicial doctrines and tests have not fared well. 370 All these
judicial doctrines and tests are inevitably modified and then outright rejected
over time as new inventions arise and challenge old doctrinal paradigms.3 1 As
the Supreme Court explained in Bilski, bright-line rules such as the machine or
transformation test do not adapt well to the constantly evolving technologies
covered by the patent system, and "new technologies may call for new
inquiries."372 New technologies present new challenges to the definition of
patentable subject matter, and bright-line rules do not adapt well to such
challenges.373
The Court's opinion in Bilski is also a perfect example of the ambiguity
inherent in the definition of an abstract idea, and the rationales for excluding
abstract ideas. Bilski involved a so-called business method patent, under which
the petitioners sought protection of a method for hedging risk against price
changes in the energy commodities market.374 The Court affirmed the Federal
Circuit's decision that the method was an unpatentable abstract idea, but neither
the Supreme Court nor the Federal Circuit below seemed to be able to agree
amongst themselves as to why the method was an abstract idea.
For example, at one point the Bilski majority opinion seemed to indicate that
the method was unduly broad because hedging risk is at base nothing more than
a mathematical formula or fundamental principle, and is therefore unpatentable
368. See Collins, Bilski, supra note 6, at 44 (noting the vague and broad definitions of an
abstract idea); Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 46.
369. Tun-Jen Chiang, The Rules and Standards of Patentable Subject Matter, 2010 Wis. L.
REv. 1353, 1356 (citing In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 952); Duffy, supra note 5, at 647; Eisenberg, supra
note 6, at 4, 16 (citing Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 304 F. App'x 866 (Fed. Cir.
2008), cert. granted, vacated, Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 130 S. Ct. 3541
(2010)).
370. See, e.g., In re Warmerdam, 33 F.3d 1354, 1358-59 (Fed. Cir. 1994) ("[T]his court and
its predecessor, as well as the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO), have sought to find more precise
definitions for the things excluded, but without complete success."); see also Duffy, supra note 5, at
616-17 (noting difficulty of adapting patentable subject matter restrictions to technological
changes).
371. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 108-29.
372. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3228 (2010); accord Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S.
63, 71 (1972); CLS Bank Int'l v. Alice Corp. Pty., 717 F.3d 1269, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (quoting
Benson, 409 U.S. at 71); Duffy, supra note 5, at 616-17.
373. Chiang, supra note 369; Duffy, supra note 5, at 610-11; Morris, supra note 41, at 498.
374. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3223-24.
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subject matter like laws or phenomena of nature.375 At other points in the Bilski
opinion, however, the majority warned against categorical limitations on
patentable subject matter, noting that it is novelty, non-obviousness, and the
other patentability requirements that serve to protect against unduly broad patent
scope.376 In fact, in more or less the same breath, the Bilski majority seemed to
suggest that the petitioners' risk hedging method was unpatentable not so much
because it did not fit within the confines of patentable subject matter under
section 101, but because the method was unpatentable as anticipated or
obviousness.377 The Court further hinted that many business methods fall into
the abstract idea category because they are so vague that they lack definiteness or
enablement.378
Which of these rationales was determinative in the Bilski case, and which
were dicta is not at all clear, nor is the guidance that we should take from the
Court's opinion. As Justice Stevens noted in his concurrence in Bilski, the Court
has "never provide[d] a satisfying account of what constitutes an unpatentable
abstract idea." 379 Again, anyone reading Bilski is left with the impression that
the decision is based on nothing more than intuition-and it is. Business
methods such as the one in Bilski just do not seem to fit within general
perceptions of patentable technology or technological work. Business methods
may involve technology, but the methods themselves seem more like a question
of economics or social constructs better classified as liberal arts, not
technological arts.38
This same intuitive sense of patentable technology also excludes raw data,
mathematical algorithms, expressive and artistic works, and other descriptive
material as unpatentable subject matter primarily because they simply do not fit
3811intuitive conceptions of useful arts. Similarly, why discoveries are
unpatentable subject matter is unclear aside from the fact that patenting the
382products of human ingenuity rather than natural forces has intuitive appeal.
Machines, on the other hand, are exactly what one might intuitively think of
375. Id. at 3231.
376. Id. at 3229.
377. Id. at 3229-30.
378. Id. at 3229.
379. Id. at 3236 (Stevens J., concurring).
380. See John F. Duffy, Why Business Method Patents?, 63 STAN. L. REv. 1247 (2011); John
R. Thomas, The Patenting of the Liberal Professions, 40 B.C. L. REV. 1139, 1169 (1999); see also
Wade M. Chumney et al., Patents Gone Wild: An Ethical Examination and Legal Analysis of Tax-
Related and Tax Strategy Patents, 46 AM. Bus. L.J. 343, 403 (2009) (noting the intuitive nature of
objections to tax-strategy patents).
381. See Collins, supra note 87, at 18; Samuelson, supra note 296, at 1112 (quoting CHISUM,
supra note 40,§ 1.01, at 1-7).
382. See Eisenberg, supra note 210, at 786; see also Morris, supra note 41 (noting patentable
subject matter is defined by "artifice and action").
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when thinking of "technology,"383 although even then, not all uses of machines
fit intuitions about patentable technology. 4
That being said, this Article is not meant to suggest that patentable subject
matter determinations are merely wild guesses, completely without a frame of
reference. While intuitionism suggests lack of objectivity and even
randomness,385 even the most intuitive decision-making has some guiding
386principles. Despite the Federal Circuit's rejection of technological arts as a
bright-line linguistic test,387 the courts have interpreted Article I, Section 8's
mandate as limiting section 101.388 The courts must therefore adhere to the
guiding principle in patentable subject matter that covers only that which
promotes progress in useful arts-such as that which constitutes patentable
technology within the meaning of Article I, Section 8. This guiding principle is
only that, however. With little else to guide them, the courts must depend heavily
on intuition in discerning what is or is not patentable technology.
But as argued elsewhere, an intuitive understanding of patentable
technology, although untethered to economic rationales, has nonetheless proven
to be surprisingly consistent over time. Within the courts' repeated attempts to
define technology are two concepts that characterize all patentable subject
matter the concepts of artifice and action. All patentable subject matter
displays some threshold degree of artifice, roughly defined as perceived degree
of alteration through human intervention.389 Likewise, all patentable subject
matter must also display at least a threshold degree of action, roughly defined as
new operation or activity through human intervention. 390 Together, artifice plus
action explain and, perhaps more importantly, unify the law on patentable
subject matter.39 '
Of course, any intuition based definition of patentable technology will never
be anything like a conveniently predictable bright-line rule nor is it necessarily
optimal for promoting progress in useful arts. Nevertheless, patentable subject
383. See CHISUM, supra note 40, § 1.02[1], at 1-12 (quoting 1 A. DELLER, WALKER ON
PATENTS 119 (2d ed., 1964)).
384. See supra text accompanying notes 254-57.
385. See Wright, supra note 10, at 1382 (quoting Gewirtz, supra note 370, at 1024); Modak-
Truran, supra note 347, at 58.
386. See Wright, supra note 10, at 1394.
387. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 960 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc); see also Diamond v. Diehr,
450 U.S. 175, 200-01 (1981) (citations omitted) (mentioning debate over "technological arts" test).
388. See, e.g., In re Comiskey, 554 F.3d 967, 976-77 (Fed. Cir. 2009) ("The Constitution
explicitly limited patentability to 'the national purpose of advancing the useful arts-the process
today called technological innovation.") (quoting Paulik v. Rizkalla, 760 F.2d 1270, 1276 (Fed. Cir.
1985) (en banc)); see also Durham, supra note 20, at 1428-29 (quoting In re Musgrave, 431 F.2d
882, 893 (C.C.P.A. 1970)) (citing CHISUM, supra note 40, § 1.01, at 1-6).
389. Morris, supra note 41, at 29-31 (quoting Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309
(1980)) (citing Hartranft v. Wiegmann, 121 U.S. 609, 615 (1887)).
390. Morris, supra note 41, at 31-34.
391. See Morris, supra note 41, at 64-82.
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matter can at least be defined by those general features that do consistently
distinguish patentable from unpatentable technology.
Further, as explained above, patentable subject matter law has some purpose
and does some work beyond that of the other patentability requirements. To be
sure, patentable subject matter overlaps with and serves some of the same
purposes as the other patentability requirements, such as distinguishing vague
ideas from concrete inventive concepts.392 But only patentable subject matter
serves to distinguish patentable technology from unpatentable discoveries,
information, and human thought and activity. Patentable subject matter
restrictions cabin the patent system to patentable technology and the useful arts,
as vague and intuitive as those concepts may be.393 Only once patentable subject
matter has been established do the other patentability requirements winnow out
those technologies that are not novel, non-obvious, and complete enough to
warrant patent protection.
Whether restricting the patent system to only those inventions that are
intuitively perceived as technological serves in any way to promote
technological progress is an open question, of course. Perhaps, if nothing else,
these restrictions achieve some minimal level of uniformity within the one-size-
fits-all patent system by limiting it to only inventions that meet intuitive
understandings about protectable technology.39 4 Regardless, patentable subject
matter does impose restrictions that no other patentability requirement does.
The patent system nonetheless must rely on intuition to distinguish the
technological from the non-technological arts. While this kind of resort to
intuitionism may seem suspect when there is no right answer to an unfalsifiable
question, intuition is no worse than any other answer.395 Where cases present
novel or complex questions, resolution of those questions will inevitably fall
396back on "judgment and practical wisdom," that is, intuition.
Indeed, many commentators and jurists have long commented on patent
law's reliance on intuitionism.397 In modem times the issue is usually phrased
more as one about standards versus rules, but the underlying point is the same: in
order to achieve the flexibility to address new technologies and technological
392. See supra text accompanying notes 150-83 (discussing relationship between patentable
subject matter restrictions and novelty, non-obviousness, and other patentability requirements).
393. See text accompanying notes 168-172.
394. See Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 48 (citing Michael W. Carroll, One Size Does Not Fit All:
A Framework for Tailoring Intellectual Property Rights, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 1361 (2009); Michael W.
Carroll, One For All: The Problem of Uniformity Cost in Intellectual Property Law, 55 AM. U. L.
REV. 845, 849 (2006)).
395. Wright, supra note 10, at 1394-95.
396. Wright, supra note 10, at 1421; see also Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr., The Judgment
Intuitive: The Function of the "Hunch" in Judicial Decisions, 14 CORNELL L. REV. 274, 278
(1928-29) (discussing use of intuition in complex issues).
397. 1 GEORGE LITCH ROBERTS, PATENTABILITY OF INVENTIONS AND THE INTERPRETATION
OF PATENTS 181 (Little, Brown, and Co. ed., 1927) (quoting Krementz v. S. Cottle Co., 148 U.S.
556 (1892)); Hutcheson, supra note 359, at 283 (quoting ROBERTS, supra, at 181).
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developments as they arise, patent law must be flexible in a way that bright-line
rules cannot. Unlike rules, which specify ahead of time how the law should be
applied, standards provide only the rough contours of the law, leaving for later a
determination of how exactly to apply that law to the circumstances at hand. 398
Standards therefore provide less predictability up front but greater flexibility to
address uncertain conditions and, as a result, are better able to withstand the tests
of time.3 99 Because standards are more open-ended, however, they are also
much more subject to discretion and the exercise of judgment than are bright-line
rules.400 Intuitionism and the use of standards over rules are thus congruent in
401
many ways.
Not surprisingly, standards-and hence, intuitionism are common in patent
law. The non-obviousness, utility, enablement, and even written description
requirements all lie along a spectrum, forcing courts to make judgment calls
about how non-obvious, useful, or enabled an invention must be to be
patentable.402 Non-obviousness, for example, is an area of patent law in which
the Supreme Court has rejected rigid, bright-line rules, favoring instead "an
expansive and flexible approach" based on prior art and the PHOSITA standard,
but providing little other guidance in defining the threshold between obviousness
and non-obviousness.403 Non-obviousness doctrine has been widely criticized
for lacking a solid definitional foundation,404 but commentators have also widely
acknowledged the need for flexibility across highly divergent technologies.4 05
Much the same story applies with regard to the enablement requirement. The
courts have rejected rigid adherence to bright-line rules in favor of a more
discretionary enablement standard that allows the flexibility to address the
technology at hand.406  Given the constantly changing nature of patentable
technology, the Supreme Court has often voiced a preference for standards over
398. Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 557
(1992).
399. Chiang, supra note 369, at 1355; Duffy, supra note 5, at 610-11; Morris, supra note 41,
at 517-19; see also Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REv. 577, 609
(1988) (arguing that broad "muddy" rules are often more effective than clear, "crystal" rules).
400. See Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 14; Wright, supra note 10, 1398-99.
401. Roscoe Pound, The Theory ofJudicial Decision, 36 HARV. L. REv. 940, 951 (1923).
402. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 99, at 1577; Duffy, supra note 5, at 639 (citing KSR Int'l
Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 419 (2007); Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534-35 (1966);
In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).
403. KSR Int'l Co., 550 U.S. at 415; Gregory Mandel, The Non-Obvious Problem: How the
Indeterminate Nonobviousness Standard Produces Excessive Patent Grants, 42 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 57, 70 (2008).
404. See Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, The Inducement Standard of Patentability,
120 YALE L.J. 1590, 1609 (2011); Jeanne C. Fromer, The Layers of Obviousness in Patent Law, 22
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 75, 76 (2008); Mandel, supra note 403, at 64.
405. See Abramowicz & Duffy, supra note 404, at 1645; Burk & Lemley, supra note 99, at
1579; Mandel, supra note 365, at 126 (citing Rose, supra note 403, at 604-10).
406. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 99, at 1670; Kevin Emerson Collins, Enabling After-
Arising Technology, 34 J. CoRP. L. 1083, at Pt. 11 (2009).
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bright-line rules across a range of patent issues, including patentable subject
matter.4 07
In point of fact, saying that what qualifies as patentable technology and
promotes useful arts is inevitably intuitive in nature is the same as saying that
patentable subject matter is defined by the standard of what qualifies as a useful,
or technological, art. It is an exceedingly brief standard, to be sure, and provides
little to no direction in how it is to be applied. The courts, which could not
possibly have the technological expertise to understand fully every invention that
comes before them, may prefer bright-line rules to guide their decisions and
relieve them of the need to engage deeply in the technology at hand.408 As much
as the law may strive for structure and predictability, however, patentable subject
matter doctrine must chart such uncertain waters that the correct outcome and
any objectively explicit rationale for reaching to that outcome are far from clear.
Although bright-line rules can provide greater predictability, rigid adherence to a
bright-line rule can produce results that would strike anyone as just intuitively
absurd.
Moreover, intuitionism, standards, and case by case balancing of factors are
common in many areas of intellectual property law. Professor Mark McKenna,
for example, has written convincingly on the lack of a cohesive rationale when it
comes to distinguishing protectable from unprotectable subject matter under
trademark law's functionality doctrine.409 The courts have long wavered on the
policy rationales underlying the functionality doctrine, and stated methods for
identifying and even defining functionality vary case by case. Instead, what
really seems to be driving application of the functionality doctrine is
"longstanding, if unexamined, intuitions about the types of features that are
competitively important." 410
Others have also noted a similar reliance on intuition when it comes to
copyrightable subject matterand distinguishing protectable expression from
unprotectable ideas. 411 As Professor Lloyd Weinreb has noted, all expression
407. Duffy, supra note 5; Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 14 n.77. But see David 0. Taylor,
Formalism and Antiformalism in Patent Law Adjudication: Rules and Standards, 46 CONN. L. REV.
415, 422-23 (2013) (arguing that patent law should employ more bright-line rules).
408. See generally Peter Lee, Patent Law and the Two Cultures, 120 YALE L.J. 2, 10-11
(2010) (quoting Stephen Breyer, Introduction to FED. JUDICIAL CTR., REFERENCE MANUAL ON
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 1, 3 (2d ed. 2000)) (arguing that formalism can relieve judges of the need to
engage in highly complex technological concepts); ef Ethyl Corp. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 541 F.2d
1, 67 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc) (Bazelon, C.J., concurring) (citing Etvtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v.
Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 597-98 (1971)) ("[S]ubstantive review of mathematical and scientific
evidence by technically illiterate judges is dangerously unreliable.").
409. McKenna, supra note 286, at 824.
410. Id. at 824-25
411. See, e.g., Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 123 (2d Cir. 1930) (."[W]hile
we are as aware as anyone that the line [between protectable and unprotectable content], wherever it
is drawn, will seem arbitrary, that is no excuse for not drawing it; it is a question such as courts
must answer in nearly all cases'); Lee, supra note 408, at 14 (quoting Leslie A. Kurtz, Speaking to
the Ghost: Idea and Expression in Copyright, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1221, 1222 (1993)).
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derives from and includes ideas, and as such, distinguishing between the two is
fraught with difficulty. 412  Professor Weinreb demonstrates that how courts
decide whether something is an unprotectable idea or copyrightable expression
are typically just ad hoc rationalizations tailored to the court's desired outcome,
and that the policies supposedly underlying copyright protection more
generally including many of those, such as incentives and natural rights, that
have been cited in support of patent doctrine fail to explain how courts actually
identify copyrightable subject matter.4 13 As Professor Weinreb explains it, "the
arguments turn out to be based on theoretical assumptions having little more
concrete underpinning than a conventional understanding that books and certain
other kinds of authorial works are copyrightable, the very proposition that the
policies are said to justify."4 14 In other words, courts do not rely on doctrine, but
instead simply rely on intuition to tell them what is copyrightable subject matter.
The next logical question, of course, is how intuitions are developed about
the proper subject matter for the various types of intellectual property
protections. How is it that courts develop an intuitive sense of what falls within
the confines of patentable subject matter? In addressing the same question
regarding copyrightable subject matter, Professor Weinreb refers to a
conventional understanding of what may be copyrighted based on historical
practice and understandings that have persisted despite the myriad technological
developments that have created new media for expression.4 The same can
likely be said of intuitive or conventional understandings of what constitutes
patentable subject matter. Courts and commentators alike routinely refer to
historical understandings of the patent system in analyzing patentable subject
matter,4 16 and they are undoubtedly correct in recognizing history's influence.
Applying these historically based understandings to modern day technologies
presents obvious difficulties but hence the reliance on intuitionism.
As the discussion above demonstrates, intuition plays a much larger role in
patentable subject matter than just a few isolated cases. The role of intuitionism
in patent law is inevitable, however, and acknowledgment as such is not
necessarily a condemnation of either the patent system generally or patentable
subject matter law specifically. Indeed, acknowledging the intuitive,
indeterminate nature of decision-making in patentable subject matter can actually
412. Weinreb, supra note 296, at 1153.
413. Id.
414. Id.
415. Id. at 1180-93; see also Lee, supra note 408, at 14 ("A brief foray into copyright law
further illustrates the difficulties posed by technological subject matter.")
416. See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3232 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Diamond v.
Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 182-84 (1981) (citations omitted); In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 966-72 (Fed.
Cir. 2008) (Dyk, J., concurring) (citations omitted); see generally Coulter, supra note 8, at 487
(exploring the history of the term "useful Arts" in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the Constitution);
Durham, supra note 20 (comparing historical understandings of "useful Arts" with information
technologies); Gruner, supra note 333, at 376 (quoting Coulter, supra note 8, at 498) (similar);
Sarnoff, supra note 64 (explaining the origin of categorical exclusions).
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foster the legitimacy of that decision-making.417 And in any event, adverting to
the large role intuition inevitably plays can perhaps at least save the patent
system from expending further resources on trying to devise yet more bright-line
rules to address patentable subject matter.
V. CONCLUSION
Patentable subject matter is a difficult area of law. The existing broad
categories of included and excluded subject matter are vague, and the rules and
rationales proffered thus far for distinguishing between the two have resulted
only in further confusion.
This is not surprising. Patent law is a one-size-fits-all system, but is
designed not only to incentivize the creation of new and unique inventions but
also to do so across a wide array of technologies. Creating uniform patentable
subject matter criteria to address such a wide diversity of technology is difficult
418
enough. Creating criteria that would optimize the balance between
incentivizing investments in technology with unduly hindering future
development is impossible. This leaves the courts with nothing on which to rely
except their own intuitions in determining what is or is not technology and
therefore a useful art within the meaning of the Constitution's intellectual
property clause.4 19
Indeed, far from being the cause of patentable subject matter's
indeterminacy, resort to intuition is simply that indeterminacy's inevitable result.
Rather than cycling through and ultimately abandoning judicial test after
economic rationale after legal precedent in hopeless pursuit of precision then,
perhaps a better approach is simply to embrace patentable subject matter's
unavoidably intuitive nature. Explicitly acknowledging the intuitive nature of
patentable subject matter allows us to recognize that patentability is not a bright-
line, binary characteristic, but rather a matter of judgment best governed by
standards rather than bright-line rules. This in turn will allow the patent system
to adapt to new technologies more readily by moving away from the kinds of
efforts at bright-line rules that have led patentable subject matter doctrine astray.
417. Cf Jessie Allen, The Persistence of Proximate Cause: How Legal Doctrine Thrives on
Skepticism, 90 DENV. U. L. Rev. 77 (2012) (discussing how acknowledging indeterminacy and
intuitive decision-making can enhance credibility).
418. See Duffy, supra note 5, at 614 (arguing that "rules" restricting patentable subject matter
prove unstable due to technological change); Gruner, supra note 221, at 356 n.5 (similar).
419. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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